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This dissertation was written as a part of the Master of Science (MSc) in Cybersecurity 
at the International Hellenic University, during the academic year 2018-2020. 
In the Introductory Chapter, the general concept of Social Media Platforms will be intro-
duced, accompanied by a brief explanation on the importance of users’ data utilization by 
Law Enforcement Authorities.  
The thesis is separated in five (5) chapters. In chapter 1, the categories and forms of Social 
Media Platforms are analyzed. Chapter 1 focuses on defining social media, along with 
providing a historical preview of the most known social networks. Moreover, the terms 
related to cybercrime and the roles of the police agencies that investigate it, are presented.  
Chapter 2 gets into a deep analysis of the relationship between social media and users’ 
data. A preview on how the legislation regarding the protection of people’s personal data 
changed through time, is unraveled. Additionally, the definition of the term “Big Data” 
is mentioned, along with a brief description of the implemented data storage mechanisms. 
In chapter 3, the most common types of cybercrime committed on social media, are thor-
oughly examined. Furthermore, the collaboration between Law Enforcement Authorities 
and Social Media Platforms is studied, including the requesting for disclosure of users’ 
data, along with any other applied investigating practices.  
Chapter 4 heads inside a Law Enforcement Authority. Real time scenarios of criminal 
cases and interviews of high-ranking law enforcement agents are unfurled, accompanied 
by a presentation of the Hellenic Cyber Crime Unit paradigm. 
Chapter 5 proposes the development of a new intelligence database, which may amelio-
rate the collaboration between Law Enforcement Authorities and Social Media Platforms. 
In addition, several recommendations are presented, concerning the improvement of the 
services of the Hellenic Cyber Crime Division. 
The “Conclusions” chapter evaluates in brief what we have learned from the whole thesis. 
Lastly, the “Discussions” chapter, deals with the widely discussed concerns on the subject 
of usage of social media users’ data by the police.     
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It is common sense that the year 2020 has been a major setback. Pandemic, quarantines, 
natural disasters, wars in the western civilization, etc. But this is not the first time that 
planet Earth faces such crises. Although it may seem a distant past from today’ s commu-
nity, people have suffered from these phenomena repeatedly. The only aspect that is dif-
ferent nowadays may be stated in just one word. Information. Information is power. Every 
single person has the power to gain knowledge of what is happening right now, across the 
entire planet. People can interact with each other, make all kinds of transactions, exchange 
thoughts, or even create intimate relationships. Even though, Internet has provided this 
kind of power, nothing could be achieved without the existence of an intermediate which 
would congregate all this information. This intermediate has a name, and it is called So-
cial Media Platform (SMP). 
Social Media Platforms present their users with a unique opportunity. To visit a virtual 
world and coexist with other people. The possibilities that these platforms provide are 
endless. A person from France may interact with another person from China through 
“Tinder” and form a romantic relationship. A developer from United Kingdom could find 
his/her dream job in the U.S.A. through “LinkedIn”. A Greek patient, having a rare dis-
ease, could join a group of people facing the same challenges and learn alternative meth-
ods of healing; just by searching through “Facebook”. It may not sound that fascinating 
for someone who has been raised with this kind of technology. But what would people 
do if social media just seized to exist? Could they handle this kind of loss?  
Communication and information are the two pillars which established the foundations of 
our “Information Society” era. Politics, heath, relationships, business, education; every-
thing is based on these two pillars. Social media were created to facilitate them. Providing 
that they are used with righteousness and under the applicable law, society can only ben-
efit from them.   
Nonetheless, social medias’ users should not get carried away. As technology progresses, 
criminals’ methods do to. People tend to believe everything that is presented to them, 
without any further seek for knowledge. Cyberspace is no exception. In the next few 
chapters, a detailed analysis on how these platforms function will be unraveled. In every 
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single service provided by the platforms, there will always be a penetrator who will try, 
and many times achieve to exploit it. This criminal act may be against a simple user, a 
multinational company or even a public institution.  
Consequently, the wide spread of Social Media Platforms renders as a necessity, the es-
tablishment of Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs), specialized in investigating cyber-
crime. Each country has its own specialized police forces. They are called “Cyber Crime 
Units” (CCUs). Depending on the public sector they serve, they require different kind of 
specialized knowledge (forensics examination, networking, cybersecurity, malware anal-
ysis, etc.). At this point it is important to clarify that CCUs are not responsible for Internet 
Governance. People may think that what a cybercrime agent does, is monitor the cyber-
space traffic and prevent everything that may cause damage.  But this is not entirely ac-
curate. 
Law Enforcers involved in cybercrime, are burdened with the responsibilities of investi-
gating crimes that take place inside the cyberspace, not securing its data traffic. Although 
preventing cyber criminality would resolve every probable issue, it is a method that is not 
applied in reality. Identify theft, child sexual abuse/exploitation, fraud related cases, are 
merely some of the crimes related to their investigations. The major challenge of a CCU, 
is to find the legitimate means in order to discover the unknown perpetrators’ personal 
information. To resolve this problem, social networks came to their aid. 
In order to gain access into a social network and reap its benefits, a user must create a 
profile. Through the registration process, users provide several personal data. Registered 
e-mail, contact information, full name, or username, are only some of them. Moreover, 
under their terms of services, social media store users’ networking information (IP ad-
dresses, timestamp, time zone). Many of them may also store, sent or received files (pho-
tographs, videos, messages, etc.). Although the average user may not understand the im-
portance of this information, LEAs can find them very useful.  
What is dubious about this method, is at what point CCUs are justified to request and 
receive a user’s personal data by Social Media Platforms. Is it legitimate to use them in 
penal proceedings, or may it cause throwbacks? Many journalists, authors and academics 
have tried to provide a justified answer. This thesis will try to present a different angle 




1 Introduction to the concepts of Social Me-
dia Platforms and Cybercrime 
1.1 What Social Media Platforms are – Web 2.0. 
There have been many given definitions regarding a Social Media Platform. In «How the 
World Changed Social Media», Miller/ Costa et al. describe social media as “the coloni-
sation of the space between traditional broadcast and private dyadic communication, 
providing people with a scale of group size and degrees of privacy that we have termed 
scalable sociality.” [1]. What the authors try to explain is that SMPs were created to fill 
the gap between public forums and private conversations. Before their existence, there 
were many websites that provided public group chats, or plenty of applications via which 
someone could chat with a friend. What is different after the introduction of social media 
is that they have provided a means, through which private communications were finally 
reachable through group communication programs.  
Merriam – Webster’s online dictionary defines social media as “forms of electronic com-
munication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which 
users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and 
other content (such as videos)” [2]. This definition aims to describe the possibilities that 
SMPs provide, in more general terms.  
Although “social media” is the widely accepted term for social networking platforms, 
Internet users should not be confused. It must be clarified that Social Network Sites 
(SNSs), such as “Facebook”, “Twitter”, etc., are just a certain type of social media. SMPs 
can be categorized into six groups: 
1. Collaborative projects (e.g., “Wikipedia”), 
2. Blogs, including microblogs (e.g., “Twitter”), 
3. Content communities (e.g., “YouTube”), 
4. Social networking sites (e.g., “Facebook”, “LinkedIn”), 
5. Virtual game worlds (e.g., “World of Warcraft”), and 
6. Virtual social worlds (e.g., Second Life). [3] 
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Nevertheless, as the majority of people use Social Networking Sites, they do not under-
stand the differences between SMPs and their basic characteristics. Let us take a closer 
look to SNSs and try to understand their importance. 
What are Social Networking Sites? The most adequate definition is the one given by 
Danah M. Boyd, a Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research and the founder of Data & 
Society, who tried, and to a great extent achieved to define and characterize social media. 
According to her, “We define social network sites as web-based services that allow indi-
viduals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) ar-
ticulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and no-
menclature of these connections may vary from site to site.” [4].  By giving this definition, 
the author has listed the three stages that every user must repeat in every social network 
platform.  
Though the registration phase of a SNS, the user is asked to create a profile before begin-
ning his/her virtual experience. S/He is provided with a form, usually containing a series 
of questions, which vary from date of birth and full name (external identifying personal 
data) to preferred hobbies or current employment (social personal data), as demonstrated 
in Figure 1. Another common practice is the upload of a personal photo, which will be 
widely visible and is requested so as to identify a single user, among many others. De-
pending on the SNS, the user must also answer different kinds of questions. Although 
some of them may only ask for an email address or a registered phone number, some 
others need profoundly more personal information to complete the desirable profile. At 
the end of this process, a profile is generated through the series of questions and a unique 
identity for the user in question is produced.  
The basic concept of a SNS, is to connect its users to the virtual world. Thus, after the 
creation of the profile, the “netizens” (i.e., Internet users [5]) are encouraged to browse 
the platform and find others, with whom they are able to share a vague but promising 
connection. The kind of connection varies from ethnicity or religion, to preferred sport or 
music interests. These relationships/connections are characterized as “Friends”, “Follow-
ers”, “Subscribers”, etc. They differ from one SNS to another and they represent the form 
of connections that their designers wish to establish. What is also different through each 
SNS, is the choice of making a “friendship”. Usually this choice is bidirectional, meaning 
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that each user is given the option of being “Friends” with another user or contrariwise, 
block him/her.   
As previously mentioned, each 
“cybernaut” (i.e., “a netizen” 
[6]) has his/her own “Friends” 
list. The key to this feature, is 
the public view of each user’s 
connections. Plenty SNSs al-
low every user to check an-
other’s “Friends” list, while 
some others demand a prior 
connection between two 
“netizens”, according to their 
enabled privacy settings. 
Viewers are partially allowed to go through the entire “network graph”, through another’s 
“Friends” list. Although it may seem quite worthless for the average user, it is a valuable 
tool for the person who needs to dig inside the SNS, or even for the expansion of the Net 
itself. 
Another remarkable attribute of SNSs is the ability to share content. The majority of so-
cial media allow their users to exchange messages, share videos and photographs, or even 
be a part of real-time videos. Messaging is divided in two categories: a) direct messaging, 
and b) content responding or “comments”. Undoubtedly, sharing any kind of content is 
the main goal of the founders of each platform. Communication, which resolves to the 
creation of a community inside a virtual world. 
Social Media Platforms have altered the ways of the World Wide Web (WWW). Before 
2005, when the vast thriving of SNSs occurred, Internet websites functioned in a more 
passive manner. There were no connections between creators and viewers. In 2000, the 
 
Figure 1: The different catego-
ries of Personal Information 
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Internet was purely used for the provision of news and historical information and conse-
quently caused the crisis of its economy. Web 2.0, which is the concept of the next – 
generation Internet technologies (interactive Internet) [7], is highly dependable with so-
cial media. In reality, SNS technologies were the founders of WWW’s new era. The role 
of the “average user” has seized to exist and gave its place to the “data distributor”. The 
enabling of communication along with the provision of content (live or already existed 
data), have turned the “netizen” into a contributor to Internet’s content. Broadly speaking, 
“virtual communities” promote the expression of thoughts, opinions, or beliefs of any 
kind [8]. The new applications that SNSs featured, along with the interactive capabilities 
they provided, proclaimed the need for individual users to play a significant role in the 
expansion of WWW. Thus, anyone may effortlessly jump to the conclusion, that the in-
duction of SNSs is of great importance. To make things even simpler: is there anyone 
who does not have a profile in any Social Media Platform?   
1.2 Which are the most famous Social Media Plat-
forms and how they operate 
Although all major SMPs made their appearance around 2005, the very first social net-
work was introduced to the public in 1997 and its name was “SixDegrees.com”. Surely, 
many others existed prior to it, like “classmates.com” or “match.com”, but none of them 
combined all the basic characteristics of a SNS. “SixDegrees.com” successfully enabled 
the features of creating profiles, producing a “Friends” list and, in 1998, to surf another 
user’s “Friends” list. The features were presented as electronic bulletin boards, e-mails, 
and online messages. The concept behind this SNS was to allow its users, who were pre-
viously unknown to each other, to connect and interact through messaging (Figure 2). 
Although it attracted many users, “SixDegrees’” services were closed in 2000.  
Going forward to year 2001, “Wikipedia” is being launched. As stated in its website, 
“Wikipedia is an online free-content encyclopedia project helping to create a world in 
which everyone can freely share in the sum of all knowledge” [9]. “Wikipedia’s” website 
is supported by “Wikimedia Foundation” and it is presented as a “free-content online 
encyclopedia project”. It allows the users to voluntarily add content to the website’s da-
tabases (DBs), resulting in the creation of a gigantic online library. Every page consists 
of several links that cite additional articles, regarding the referred topic. “Wikipedia” 
stores users’ personal information, such as IP addresses and public contributions [10].  
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       Figure 2: Six Degrees of Separation 
 
The year is 2003 and “LinkedIn” introduces itself to the public. It is a SNS, created for 
professionals who seek to publicly display their work experience [3]. “LinkedIn” could 
easily be described as an online Curriculum Vitae (CV). This SNS is allegedly the largest 
“professional network” existing in 2020. As previously mentioned, it is highly recom-
mended for professionals who either seek for a job opportunity or enquire about a work 
vacancy. It can be easily understood that as users upload their personal CVs, this SNS 
stores all kind of a user’s personal data. 
In the same year, another SNS was created. Its name was “MySpace”. In 2006, 
“MySpace” overtook “Google” and became the most visited SNS in the U.S.A. Although 
“MySpace” is not that commonly used nowadays, it made a huge impact in today’s net-
working society.  
Another important part of SMPs is “content communities” [11]. Websites like “4chan”, 
“YouTube”, “Pinterest” and “Reddit” allow their users to share multimedia content with 
each other. The type of content varies from photographs and videos, to articles and short 
stories. It is important to mention that these “content communities”, not only store per-
sonal information provided by the users through the registration phase, but they also store, 
and some time own, the content that the users upload. Thus, it is of high importance that 
the users read the “Terms of Service” of each SMP and not just use it as a storage location 
for their uploaded media. 
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As it has been already mentioned, “YouTube” is considered a “content community”. This 
SMP was founded in 2005 but was eventually purchased in 2006 from one of the greatest 
technology companies, “Google LLC”. Ever since, “YouTube” is considered as one of 
“Google’s” subsidiaries. Despite the fact that “Google” is widely recognized for its search 
engine, it is considered as one of the most widespread online communities across the 
planet. All services provided by “Google” (Maps, Search Engine, Gmail, Chrome, etc.) 
may be integrated in one single account, created by the user in question. Categorically, 
“Google” cannot be presented as a SMP. Nevertheless, some of its services’ characteris-
tics are familiar to SMPs’ attributes, such as messaging through “Gmail” or creating a 
“Friends” list.    
Going forward to 2004, the users encounter “Facebook” for the first time. In the beginning 
it was introduced to Harvard students. In 2005, “Facebook’s” network expanded to high 
schools and it was until 2006, that its founders provided its services to the public. “Face-
book” could easily be provided as an example for defining a SNS. It allows its users to 
create a uniquely identified profile, roam through the network, add virtual friends and 
check other users’ “Friends” list. As shown in Figure 3, “Facebook” is the most popular 
SNS in 2020, ranked by number of active users. It can be easily comprehended that “Fa-
cebook” may store a significant amount of a user’s personal information, either through 
the registration phase, or by the content shared among users or even through the plat-
form’s messaging feature. 
Figure 3: Most popular social networks worldwide as of July 2020, ranked by number of active 
users (in millions) 
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Along with “Facebook”, Facebook Inc. owns another highly influential SNS. “Instagram” 
was originally launched in 2010 and it is proclaimed to be an application between “con-
tent community” and a SNS. “Instagram” is a modern medium, which allows its users to 
capture their lives’ moments and share them with their “Friends” (i.e., “Followers”) [12]. 
This SNS also enables messaging among users, through “direct messaging”. “Instagram” 
is one of the most rapidly growing SNSs, as in just ten years of existence, has more than 
one billion registered users (Figure 3). Although “Instagram” is highly widespread to the 
public, it has been the subject of criticism, most importantly for the improper material 
uploaded by its users.  
“Twitter” is yet another major SMP, proclaimed to be a SNS. The website - application 
allows its registered users to post content and interact through messages, called “tweets”. 
The fact that these services are only provided for registered users, while unregistered ones 
can only read the “tweets”, is notable. “Twitter” was originally launched in 2006 and it is 
owned by the company “Twitter Inc.” [3]. “Twitter” also stores a considerable amount of 
information regarding its users, such as account history, account activity, associated de-
vices, etc. [13].  
Despite the numerous digital platforms existing in cyberspace, this thesis could not omit 
one of 2020’s trends. “Tik Tok” is a SNS, usually downloaded as an application for i-
Phone Operating Systems (iOS) or Androids and was developed in order to create an 
“online entertainment community” [14]. “Tik Tok” was launched in 2017 in China, but 
became available to the rest of the world, after its amalgamation with “Musical.ly”, in 
2018. By examining Figure 3, it can easily be understood that in only two years, “Tik 
Tok” managed to become one of the most famous SNSs worldwide. 
Last but not least, “dating apps” should be acknowledged as one of the most unique cat-
egories of SMPs, as they have a major impact on establishing today’s socializing culture. 
“Tinder”, “Bumble”, “PlanetRomeo” and “The League” are some of the sites that belong 
to this special category. In the next chapters, the importance of “dating apps” will be 
manifested, since penetrators tend to frequently use them with the intention to find their 
“sitting ducks” (i.e., easy targets or victims [15]). Thus, their impact in acquiring users’ 
data for investigating cyber criminals is signified. 
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1.3 General concepts of cybercrime – Historical Pre-
view 
Along with its provided financial and interactive benefits, cyberspace offers an ideal vis-
ual environment for the thriving of criminality [16]. While offences committed through 
personal interaction have reached their zenith internationally, cybercrime is introduced as 
an alternative method of criminality. Theft, bullying, sexual abuse, terrorism are crimes 
committed every day worldwide. The different possibility that cyberspace provides is an-
onymity. Instead of executing these violations through interpersonal contact, a criminal 
may stay in his/her apartment and act harmfully against a person living on the other side 
of the planet. Additionally, if s/he possesses the proper knowledge and the proper tools, 
s/he may destroy all evidence that could possibly lead to his/her true identity.  
Historically in 1994, as the need for protection against cybercrime increased, United Na-
tions formed a manual, in order to define it, designate its common traits and build the first 
line of defense against offenders. According to the manual, the most usually committed 
crimes on cyberspace were: (i) fraud by computer manipulation, (ii) computer forgery, 
(iii) damage to or modifications of computer data or programs, (iv); unauthorized access 
to computer systems and service, and (v) unauthorized reproduction of legally protected 
computer programs [17].  
Moving forward to 2001, the Convention on Cybercrime [18], held in Budapest, provided 
a list of all related criminal offences. Namely, these offences are: (i) – Offences against 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems, (ii) – Com-
puter-related offences, (iii) – Content-related offences and (iv) – Offences related to in-
fringements of copyright and related rights [19].     
The fact that any research, academical writing or guide regarding cybercrime, integrates 
a definition of the term is well known. According to EC3 (see below, p. 14): “Cyber-
dependent crime can be defined as any crime that can only be committed using computers, 
computer networks or other forms of information communication technology (ICT)” [20]. 
Moreover, another given definition refers to the term cybercrime as: “crime that is ena-
bled by, or that targets computers” [21]. By comparing each approach, the reader may 
come to a very significant conclusion. Although, the words of the definitions change, the 
concepts that surround the term itself, remain the same. Thus, this thesis may not try to 
define cybercrime per se. On the contrary it will present in plain terms the surrounding 
concepts of the term, as well as the related offences. 
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The basic terms related to a cybercrime are: “computer system”, “computer data”, “ser-
vice provider” and “traffic data”. As defined in the Convention on Cybercrime: 
1. “computer system means any device or a group of interconnected or related devices, 
one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of 
data”, 
2. “computer data means any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form 
suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause 
a computer system to perform a function”,  
3. “service provider means: 
i. any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability 
to communicate by means of a computer system, and 
ii. any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such 
communication service or users of such service” and 
4. “traffic data means any computer data relating to a communication by means of a 
computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of 
communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, 
date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.” [18]. 
Another substantial term that should be included among the rest, is “network”. A “net-
work” is “an interconnection between two or more computer systems” [3]. Before mov-
ing on to listing criminal offences related to cybercrime, an analysis of the surrounding 
terms is necessary. 
A “computer system” can be any kind of device, or group of devices, containing both 
software and hardware, resulting in an “automatic processing of data” [3]. Automatic 
processing refers to a process that does not need human handling. It should be noted that 
since technology changes rapidly, a specific list of “computer systems” does not exist, as 
any technology non-registered in the list, would fall outside the provided legislative pro-
visions. 
According to the ISO standard [22], “data is a reinterpretable representation of infor-
mation in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or pro-
cessing”. Practically, “computer data” as a cybercrime related term, is any information 
stored in a physical medium (e.g., USB flash drive), a computer system’s memory or a 
cloud service, that can be automatically processed by the computer system in question. 
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Hence, the inclusion of the term “program”, as the means which automatically processes 
data, becomes quite clear.  
To conclude the basic concepts of cybercrime, it is considered unavoidable to enumerate 
the criminal acts constituting it. As stated in the Convention on Cybercrime, offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems, com-
puter-related offences, and content-related offences, consist of the criminal acts depicted 
in Figure 4 [16].   
Figure 4: Categories of Cybercrime 
 
Namely, the related offences of each category, according to the Council of Europe are: 
1. Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and 
systems: 
i. Illegal access, 
ii. Illegal interception, 
iii. Data interference, 
iv. System interference, 
v. Misuse of devices. 
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2. Computer-related offences: 
i. Computer-related forgery, 
ii. Computer-related fraud. 
3. Content-related offences: 
i. Offences related to child sexual abuse/exploitation. 
4. Regarding offences associated with infringements of copyright and related rights, 
the Council of Europe assigned each member state with the responsibility of legis-
lating the right and proper law, in order to establish the related criminal offences, 
under its domestic legislation [21]. 
1.4 Cyber Crime Units – Operation, Training and 
Public Interaction 
Before heading deep inside the core of the thesis, it is inevitable to briefly discuss the role 
of a Cyber Crime Unit. CCUs are specialized Law Enforcement Authorities and are con-
sidered to be the most significant part of disrupting and preventing cybercrime. Where 
local police’s jurisdiction ends, CCUs perform their duties in order to uncover the un-
known perpetrator’s true identity.    
As stated in the Introductory Chapter, Internet has offered many advantages in modern 
communication and interaction. But whenever society finds a way to make life easier for 
its individuals, there will always be a percentage of the population that will try to exploit 
these merits, to its own profit. Assuredly, crime had existed long before Internet’s birth. 
However, the ushering of cybercrime proclaimed the need of implementing special tech-
niques, in the war against criminals.  
Whereas the traditional model for police investigations consists of hands-on approach on 
physical evidence, crime scene examination and witnesses’ statements, the foundation of 
CCUs introduced a vast variety of new investigative techniques. Social engineering, com-
puter forensics, analyzing traffic data, malware analysis, etc. are some of the methods that 
gave a significant boost in the stoppage of criminality.  
Evidence regarding cybercrime acts is usually in digital form. Computer and traffic data 
may be stored and transferred both physically and digitally. Their form varies, from com-
puter files to metadata and logs [16]. Although physical medium storages can be acquired 
through traditional police investigation, their analysis is usually performed by police 
agents in technologically suitable laboratories, by using digital forensics. On occasions 
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where prevention of crime is exceedingly demanded, police agents cooperate with other 
private entities to offer solutions for potential problems; for instance, the analysis of an 
already deployed malicious code (malware analysis) and the free distribution of its de-
cryptor key, to the public. More precisely, analyzing a user’s log data, who used his/her 
social media account to act harmfully against other users, is a case that demands at least 
the fundamental networking skills and knowledge.     
Nonetheless, there are times when exceptional expertise or technical support may not 
come in handy. Therefore, LEAs utilize SMPs for various reasons. For investigative pur-
poses as, for example, focusing on a specific individual or its network in order to obtain 
more information about him/her, or for verifying the commitment of a particular criminal 
activity. Additionally, collecting evidence regarding the criminal actor himself/herself or 
his/her current whereabouts.  
Undeniably, the leading International Police organization battling against cybercrime, is 
INTERPOL (Figure 5). Since 1980, the institution performs both as an operator and as 
an instructor. Apart from advising the public re-
garding cybercrime’s new trends, INTERPOL Cy-
bercrime Directorate, in cooperation with mem-
ber states’ LEAs, private sectors organizations 
and Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs), has coordinated several international 
operations [23]. Moreover, INTERPOL has affil-
iated with a variety of member countries’ Police Agencies, in order to train the police 
personnel and develop cyber skills, knowledge and technical abilities [24]. 
In a more regional approach, EUROPOL (Figure 6) has established an exquisite technical 
Agency, in response to cybercrime, called EC3. EC3 was built by EUROPOL in 2013, 
and its aim is to protect European citizens against 
criminal acting through Internet. The Agency per-
forms in various ways, like creating joint opera-
tions with its member states (J-CAT). Furthermore, 
EC3 organizes plenty conventions, along with a se-
ries of training seminars, in order to ensure that law 
enforcement agents are kept up to date, depending 
on their fields of expertise. Last but not least, EC3 
Figure 5: INTERPOL  
Figure 6: EUROPOL – EC3 
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annually issues a report (called IOCTA) regarding key findings, threats and advancements 
in cybercrime [25].  
Among many other LEAs that investigate cybercrime, FBI’s Cyber Division (Figure 7) 
is one of the most innovative. Along with its trained cyber squads (Cyber Action Team) 
and the established partnerships with both private and 
public sector, in order to prevent crimes against U.S.A.’s 
networks and infrastructure, the bureau has launched IC3 
and iGuardian, with which the public can interact directly 
with the Agency and file their complaints, regarding po-
tential or ongoing cybercrimes [26]. In addition, FBI is-
sues its own annual report, based on the records of IC3, 
called Internet Crime Report.  
Since we have discussed the most prominent CCUs worldwide, it would be unacceptable 
to disregard the importance of the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA – Figure 8). Even though ENISA is more of an EU’s organization, rather than a 
Law Enforcement Authority, it has significantly contributed to the war against cyber-
crime. The organization annually proposes its strategic 
objective [27], through which it wishes to achieve “a 
high common level of cybersecurity across Europe”. 
Historically, it was established in 2004 and it still coop-
erates with all member states and bodies of EU. All in 
all, ENISA’s initiative includes informing the public re-
garding potential cybercrime incidents, training EU cy-
bercrime agencies about the proper means of investiga-
tion and consulting the private sector on ways to achieve absolute cybersecurity. 
It is highly important to clarify that cybercrime investigations include all kind of tech-
niques. A cybercrime officer’s investigation is typically directed in acquiring information 
or examining the data already procured. Usually, acquiring information is an obligation 
of the “first responder”. The investigator, who this obligation is assigned to, ought to 
preserve the digital and physical evidence, determine the source of the cyber event and 
limit the perpetrator’s damage. Nevertheless, acquisition of data can be obtained through 
numerous “intelligence” techniques, which will be unraveled in the following chapters 
[28]. 
Figure 7: FBI – IC3 
Figure 8: ENISA 
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Following the stage of information acquisition, the investigation involves examination of 
data. Examination is accomplished either through automated software or by-hand. Ac-
cording to the level of expertise required, it is either completed by special examiners, 
called forensic examiners, or by traditional investigators.   
The most difficult part of a cybercrime investigation is the compilation of evidence. Even 
though evidence in an interactive crime can be effortlessly found, the limits that virtual 
worlds pose are binding. In traditional crimes, a victim’s testimony is the first piece of 
acquired evidence, along with the provision of several additional material. To aid this 
investigation, SMPs and hosting companies, may likewise provide the substantial data, 
which could possibly lead to the identification of an unknown perpetrator.  
As society has reached the “Information Era”, the use of SMPs has grown into a necessity 
for everyone. The Internet activity revolved around them leads to the fact that people have 
merged SMPs into their everyday lives. As criminal activity can be represented as a hu-
man deed, it cannot be excluded. Subsequently, as law enforcers exist in order to prevent 
such acts from taking place, the fact that they would not go beyond old-fashioned ways 
of investigations is unavoidable, in order to prevent nefarious activities [3]. As previously 
mentioned, their operation resides in identifying perpetrators, analyzing evidence and in-
troducing solutions for existent problems. Leading agencies are burdened with the re-
sponsibility of continuously training their personnel and communicating with the public. 
Let us not forget that, as technology has rapidly developed through the past years, the 
public does not possess even the slightest knowledge about Internet issues; or they are 
even afraid of it. Thus, it can be easily concluded that CCUs perform another great task. 
They are obliged to inform common people, in plain terms, for the potential dangers be-
hind the Internet and council them accordingly, to successfully prevent cybercrime. This 




2 Social Media Platforms and Users’ Data 
2.1 Data Storage from Social Media Platforms  
As described in Chapter 1, SMPs collect a wide range of data from their users. This in-
formation is usually obtained through the registration phase, which is mandatory for eve-
ryone, in order to create his/her uniquely identified profile. To add things up, every de-
veloping team related to a SMP’s activities, was obligated to collect, and manage a cha-
otic amount of data, which is being shared by the users through their provided content. 
Hence, operators had to adopt suitable mechanisms to ensure that the users’ data are being 
well organized and structured. In addition to all these technical issues, they had to reassure 
their users that their information is constantly secure.  
Even though data storing policies posed as a simple requirement for most SMP compa-
nies, they became quite challenging in the process. The main reasons behind the faced 
difficulties were two. Firstly, the growing concerns from users regarding the mining of 
their personal data. Secondly, the colossal amount of processed information. What is du-
bious about data storage from SMPs, is the doubts that every “cybernaut” poses while 
using them. “For how long is my personal information stored? What happens in the case 
of a data breach? Who will protect my privacy from a possible hacking attack? Apart 
from social media companies, which other entity manipulates my personal data?”. SMPs’ 
storage policies were only restricted by the Directive 95/46/EC. By combining the year 
that the Directive was legislated (1995) and the introduction date of Web 2.0. (2005), it 
is straightforwardly concluded that SMPs pretty much established their own storage and 
processing rules. This phenomenon, among others, gradually directed the European Un-
ion (EU) in legislating the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in 2016, which 
led to a new era in the protection of users’ personal data. 
As SMPs increased their fame amongst the public, companies that own them faced unique 
constraints regarding data storage and processing latency. As depicted in Figure 9, the 
amount of generated data is beyond reach. The upcoming challenges were related to pill-
ing up enormous amounts of data, immediate access to databases, and a continuously 
increased scale of data, accompanied with the necessity for flawless service in respect to 
the guaranteed aspect of reliability [29]. As a result, each company implemented some 
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existing databases, while others deployed their development teams to create their own. It 
is very interesting to briefly discuss the different types of storage systems and archi-
tectures, as it has challenged the limits of many SMPs.  
2.1.1 BIG DATA 
“Big Data” is a comparatively new-found term that describes the “large set of data that 
is almost impossible to manage and process using traditional business intelligence tools.” 
[30]. This definition is usually being applied to, in two different situations. Firstly, con-
cerning the challenges of storing and processing enormous amounts of data. Secondly, 
the term responds to the “sociological problem” formed by the realization that SNSs, or 
any other linked entities, methodically process and collect data involving their users [31]. 
“Big Data” has grown to be a major concern among SMPs. While user-generated data are 
growing immensely in number daily, human operators are no longer able to manipulate 
them. In specific, datasets regarding users’ uploaded data are becoming unmanageable. 
One can easily come to the conclusion that any task that has to be performed on a con-
trollable set of data, should be considered unfeasible when the number of imported data 
is unreachable. In other terms, an average user, who manipulates an insignificant amount 
of data for personal reasons (e.g., educational), can sufficiently manage them by using 
his/her personal computer (PC). Medium size data would require a different approach, 




such as parallel computing, in order to accomplish the desired outcome. Lastly, “Big 
Data” processing, demands more advanced means of performing, usually containing a 
substantial quantity of PCs with high-performing computer attributes, running specialized 
software and tools (e.g., MapReduce). The latter situation is what constitutes a “Big Data 
system” [32]. 
The term was originally conceived by Roger Mougalas, the market search director at 
O’Reily Media, in 2005. The fact that the organization coined another new definition, 
after the creation of the term “Web 2.0” a year earlier is quite remarkable [33]. Lots of 
studies and articles have been written concerning the effects of “Big Data” in the modern 
“Information Era”. Nowadays, an analysis of the term seems unavoidable. As “Big Data” 
definition proclaims, the amount of data has been so excessive that they demand more 
and more innovative means of processing. 
The characteristics of “Big Data” are also known as the three “Vs”. To elucidate them, 
they are Volume, Velocity and Variety. These terms are used both to simplify the types of 
data and the software entities, which should be more suitable in manipulating them [34].   
The Volume aspect constitutes the greatest challenge for computer engineers. They are 
presented the task of creating innovative structures, depending on scalable storage mech-
anisms and immediate acquisition of data. In plain terms, the Volume characteristic rep-
resents the nebulous amount of data produced, which is disproportionate with the amount 
of data that the traditionally used databases can afford. 
Velocity describes the increased ratio of data, newly imported or exported by an organi-
zation. Albeit SMPs guarantee many services to their users, the key component is consid-
ered to be the constant and uninterrupted flow of data. As previously mentioned, many 
SMPs’ vital feature is the sharing of users’ content. Thus, it is important for users’ data 
to flow in a much higher speed, both imported into the company’s systems and exported 
to another user’s interface. 
The final, widely accepted characteristic of “Big Data”, is Variety. It depicts the vast 
variety of data, which cannot be organized into correlated structures. For example, users’ 
presented information fluctuates, from photos and videos to texts. To make things 
messier, it can be easily understood that as far as computer communication is considered, 
exchanged data may rely on different kind of software, encoding, etc. This is a perfect 
example of how tricky the processing of “Big Data” can be [33]. 
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Technological systems and associated tools involved into processing of “Big Data” are 
[35]: 
 NoSQL databases, which are a type of database that provides the means for storing 
and regaining data. “MongoDB”, “Apache CouchDB”, “Apache Cassandra”, 
“Apache HBase”, “Hypertable” and “Apache ZooKeeper” are some of the highly 
used NoSQL DBs for “Big Data”. 
 MapReduce, which stands for the programming algorithms that process the data. 
The most famous MapReduce system is the “Apache Hadoop”. Other known sys-
tems are the “Apache Hive”, the “Apache Pig” and “Cascading”.    
 Storage services, like “S3” and the “Hadoop Distribute File System” (HDFS). 
 Servers, such as “EC2”, “Google App Engine”, “Elastic Beanstalk” and “Hero-
kou”. 
 Processing tools. Most known are the “R project”, “Yahoo! Pipes”, “Amazon Me-
chanical Turk”, “Elastic Search”, “BigSheets” and “Tinkerpop”. 
 Natural language processing (NLP). NLP’s significance is embedded in the fact 
that they were created in order to process and comprehend unmeaningful humanly 
provided data. The component contains a variety of tools like “Apache 
OpenNLP”, “Boilerpipe”, “OpenCalais” and “Natural Language Toolkit” 
(NLTK).   
 Machine Learning systems, with most commonly known services, the “Apache 
MAHOUT” and the “WEKA” frameworks. 
 The graphical representation of data, which is called Visualization. Namely, tools 
involved are “Gephi”, “GraphViz”, “Processing”, “Tableau” and “Fusion Ta-
bles”. 
 Acquisition, for working with so-called “messy data”, as “Google Refine”. 
The phenomenon of “Big Data” has created a lot of issues regarding users’ data privacy. 
Whilst a single user may generously upload his/her personal data, supposing that they are 
considered to be his/her own “property”, the overall percentage of imported data may 
easily create many confidentiality implications, due to insufficient protection [36]. Up-
loaded content, such as images, may contain information regarding another user, without 
him/her being aware of the situation. In more technical terms, a file’s metadata usually 
contains information regarding locations, time, etc., which may not only affect the owner 
of the file, but others as well. Related to this problem, resides the reference to a person 
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who may have no association with the content itself. For instance, a photo containing a 
(hyper-) link or a “textual reference”, indicating another user’s profile, may cause serious 
harm to his/her personal data [31].  
Last but not least, it is common sense that as SMPs constitute a modernized means of 
communication and information, there are users who will try to take advantage of their 
consistency and provide, either intentionally or unintentionally, fake information [37]. 
Malicious users tend to spread different kinds of fake information, causing all sorts of 
reactions, usually intending to create mayhem or to gain personal profit (fraud-related 
cases). In addition, unsuspected users tend to share the misleading information, with no 
regard to the outcome of their actions. A very vivid example related to present situations 
could be the wide spread of conspiracy theories regarding coronavirus. Although there 
are no countermeasures in order to avoid these problems, awareness is the key to eradicate 
them.  
2.1.2 Databases, architectures, and storage systems 
Every SMP embraces its own storage techniques, in order to process, store or manipulate 
in any way the imported data. Mainly, SMPs use Distributed Storage Systems (DSS) [38]. 
DSSs provide storage techniques, with which users’ data are partitioned, meaning that 
data are being split into different servers. This component provides high availability of 
data, even in cases of retrieving failure [39]. Deployed storage systems’ techniques and 
architectures could easily be a thesis’ main theme, therefore, only a brief description of 
them will be given in this chapter. 
“MySQL” is considered to be the most stable and reliable database for storing data. With 
this database, the storage of data is performed once, whilst in others, data entries are 
stored twice or even more. Creating and installing this DB is quite simple, thus it is usu-
ally preferred by developers.  
“Redis” and “Riak” are “key-value” storage systems, denoting that the mechanism of 
storing imported data involves creating keys that refer to the stored values. The difference 
between these two DBs is that while “Redis” supports lists of all ids-keys, “Riak” sup-
ports JSON documents, which is a great feature for storing SMPs’ “Big Data”. 
“MongoDB” and “CouchDB” are the document storage databases, which use the same 
data model. They also support JSON or BSON files, similarly to “Riak”. The fact that 
these two DBs provide availability for storing any kind of data, is quite remarkable. 
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“Hbase” and “Cassandra”, store the data in columns and depict them in a semi-structured 
manned, analogous to the document stores and “Riak”. They provide the combining of 
both document and key-value store [40]. 
To conclude the enumeration of DBs, “Neo4j” is a “graph database”, meaning that data 
are stored in graphical structure. With “Neo4j”, SMPs do not only store users’ data. In-
stead, they create “data relationships”, indicating that they can visualize data within their 
native origin [41].  
The most well-known storage system, used by SMPs, is called “Cassandra” and it is a 
NoSQL database management system. It was originally deployed for “Facebook”, to em-
power its inbox search feature. Nowadays, it is used as an Apache Project by most SMPs 
like “Twitter” and “Reddit”. The fact that it provides top level write processes, without 
losing read effectiveness is highly important in “Cassandra” technologies. In “Cassan-
dra”, the data storage techniques are based upon continuous “hashing” of the values, 
meaning that data is “hashed” to various data storage servers [39]. As defined, a “hash 
value” is “a numeric value of a fixed length that uniquely identifies data. Hash values 
represent large amounts of data as much smaller numeric values, so they are used with 
digital signatures” [42].  
“Twitter” is one of the most prominent SNSs. Millions of users’ “tweet” their stories and 
opinions every day. As the amount of imported data is chaotic, the company’s founders 
had to adopt the appropriate infrastructure. “Twitter” had experimented with many data-
bases over the years and made several contributions to them. But, on most occasions the 
developers understood that the deployed storage systems could simply not sustain the 
various products and services offered by the SNS. Consequently, they decided to build 
by themselves the next-generation DSS, 
called “Mahnattan” [29]. As depicted in 
Figure 10, “Manhattan” [43] and “Ha-
doop” [44] are the dominant systems 
(data-platform and database) used in 
“Twitter’s” technologies. 
 
Figure 10: Services provided by Twitter’s 
storage and messaging teams 
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“Facebook”, which is the most famous SNS in 2020, with over 2 billion users widely, 
relied on relational “MySQL” DB for data storage [45], in addition to a variety of different 
engines. “Facebook” uses the “social graph” in order to record all users’ activity through 
its virtual society. A very common example is the tracking of who “liked” another user’s 
uploaded content. This “social graph” is empowered by “MySQL”. Moreover, Facebook 
Messaging was originally stored in “Hbase” [46], whilst nowadays the component uses 
“MyRocks”, which integrates “RocksDB” and “MySQL” storage engines [47]. Other 
used databases are “Apache Hadoop”, “Apache Thrift” and “PrestoDB” for manipulation 
of “Big Data”, and “LogDevice”, as a storage system for users’ log data [48]. 
Even though “Google LLC” is not a company that provides social networking services, 
it is one of the largest companies worldwide, numbering many applications that could be 
easily considered as SMPs (e.g., “YouTube”). “Google LLC” has established its private 
“Data Centers” to store and process the nebulous amount of information, of its million 
users. In these centers, the company runs its services 24/7. They consist of aisles of server 
racks (“Google Web Servers”), which run the distributed data storage systems (“Big Ta-
ble” [49]) and the scale-databases (“Spanner”). Needless to mention that these technolo-
gies were created and founded by the company’s technical team [50].  
Finally, it is critical to enumerate some of the architectures related to “Big Data” storage 
technologies. Mainly they involve [31]: 
 Multiple clustered network attached storage (NAS). NAS is a computer data stor-
age server, connected to a network. Clustered NAS, is a NAS which uses different 
storage devices inside a network, using a single file system which is running sim-
ultaneously. Multiple clustered NAS is the system in which clustered NASs form 
different networks are employed together.   
 Object-based storage techniques, like Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS). In 
this scheme, the employed storage system manipulates unstructured or semi 
structured data. Hadoop is a data storage system, created to process a vast volume 
of data. 
 NoSql databases, MoonDB and Terra Store are used to manipulate structured 
data.  
 Apache Avro conceived in terms of nodes communication, 
 Cassandra and Hbase designed to work with Hadoop. 
 Hive, a system like SQL, but working with Hadoop. 
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 Mahoot, a tool created for machine learning. 
 Pig Latin and Zookeeper.  
2.1.3 What types of Data? 
Up to this point, this Chapter has deepened into the challenges that SMPs face regarding 
processing users’ data, as well as the deployed storage mechanisms which assist in cur-
tailing them. Thus, a presentation of what types of data each SMP stores or processes is 
deemed necessary. 
“Facebook” collects all sorts of information regarding its users and their content. The 
company’s systems automatically process data related to the content itself, date and time 
of creation or sharing, and metadata, such as the location of a photo. Moreover, the user 
may choose to provide certain types of “sensitive personal data” (see below, p. 28), 
within his/her profile, such as religious or political views, health statuses, racial or ethnic 
origin. To add things up, the SMP stores network and connectivity information, most 
importantly IP addresses, name of ISP, time zone, mobile phone number, and as stated in 
“Facebook’s” privacy page, “in some cases, information about other devices that are 
nearby or on your network”. Lastly, the automated systems process data related to device 
information, usage and transactions regarding “Facebook’s” products, information from 
partners or affiliated parties and cookies data [51]. 
According to “Twitter’s” privacy policy, the company processes data regarding basic in-
formation like provided e-mail or phone number, users’ preferred time-zone and lan-
guage, date and time of uploaded content. As far as messaging is concerned, “Twitter” 
stores and processes data regarding enhanced images, links or unified resource locators 
(URLs) and the communication information (sender-receiver and data). The fact that the 
company does not store the content of the messages is remarkable. Additionally, location, 
cookies, payment and log data (IP addresses, web browser, operating system, etc.) infor-
mation are also stored by the SNS’s systems [52].      
“Tinder”, which is the leading dating application in 2020, also collects a substantial vari-
ety of data. Login credential (username and password) and basic information, like gender 
or age, are data stored during the registration phase. Once an account is created, the SNS 
requests and processes details of a user’s personality, lifestyle or interests and content 
like photos or videos. This information is requested to fix up the users’ profile and it also 
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is a prerequisite in the match-making procedure. The company also stores messaging con-
tent, payment information, associated or verified social media accounts and information 
that other users provide them with. Finally, the SMP processes device, networking, geo-
location information and most importantly, the way that a user interacts/connects with 
another user (accounts, number of messages, etc.) [53].  
Αs mentioned in Chapter 1, another major part of SMPs are “content communities”. “Red-
dit” is one of the most prominent ones, used by millions of clients. As any other SMP, 
“Reddit” has its own privacy policy, as demonstrated in Figure 11. In this privacy pol-
icy”, the company explains in 
plain terms, the procedure re-
garding processing users’ 
data. According to it, the 
“content-community” plat-
form, separates the collected 
data in three types. The infor-
mation that the users provide 
on their own, the information 
that the platform’s systems 
process automatically and the 
data the company collects by 
other sources and third parties. The users’ provided information varies from account data 
and content, to transactional information and interactions with other users (e.g., blocking 
or following). Automatically collected information consists of log and usage data, cook-
ies, and geolocation. In the end of the privacy policy, there is an additional field in which 
the designers emphasize that, apart from the previously mentioned information, the SMP 
also acquires data related to a user, from third parties (for example embedded content 
through “YouTube”), other sources (e.g., a third-party mobile application) and advertis-
ers (reddit adds) [54].      
From what has been analyzed so far, one can easily conclude that every SMP stores and 
processes, in great extent, the same type of users’ information. There might be some di-
vergences from one platform to another, nonetheless the essential acquired data are the 
same: e-mails and passwords (as registration data), content, location and networking in-
formation. Nowadays, all SMPs thoroughly describe the kind of processed data to their 
Figure 11: Reddit Privacy Policy  
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potential “cybernauts”, through their integrated privacy policies. They deliberately re-
quest users’ consent to process their data, as it is mandatory due to the GDPR. But was 
this explicit consent always compulsory for social media companies?  
2.2 Law Change – GDPR 
Privacy and data protection are two rights enshrined in the EU Treaties and in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter contains an explicit right to the protection of 
personal data (Article 8). The Charter of Fundamental Rights has the same legal value as 
the constitutional treaties of the EU. In addition, Article 16 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU) obliges the EU to lay down data protection rules for 
the processing of personal data. The EU is unique in implementing such an obligation to 
its constitution. 
The GDPR came into effect in 2018 and constitutes a modern framework for Data Pro-
tection in Europe. The European Parliament voted for it in May 2016. Up to that point, 
data protection in the EU was mainly regulated by the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC. Moreover, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights – 
ECHR) was drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and entered into force in 1953 
(Council of Europe, 1950). In Article 8 of the ECHR, (“Right to respect for private and 
family life”), is specifically provided that “Everyone has the right to respect for his pri-
vate and family life, his home and his correspondence.”. 
Since the Directive was legislated in 1995, it is particularly apparent that due to the major 
blossom of SMPs around 2005, which adopted numerous automated systems for pro-
cessing personal data, a new legislation safeguarding “netizens’” personal information 
was of outmost necessity [55]. Even though the Directive formed the first EU legislation 
regarding data protection and widely defined the various forms of information, the GDPR 
remodeled its provisions and principles, making it more appropriate for the new “Infor-
mation Era”.  
The main difference which makes GDPR more suitable nowadays can, in the view of the 
author, be restrained in two main facts. Firstly, the Regulation introduced many changes, 
compared to the repealed Directive, mainly related to the pragmatic application in all 
processing entities and their territorial scope. Secondly, it generated much more practical 
implications to the technical design and privacy protection measures of “data controllers 
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and data processors”, regarding data storage, processing and implementations of security 
practices.       
2.2.1 Brief presentation of the GDPR 
The GDPR is the EU regulation under number (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection 
Regulation) and it came into effect on the 25th of May 2018. In general terms, it provides 
a detailed framework in which processing entities learn how to process, inform, and se-
cure “data subjects’” personal information.    
The GDPR is a legal instrument, consisting of 99 Articles. It is a “Regulation”, meaning 
that this legal text is binding and applies directly to all EU’s members. In Greece, the 
Parliament adopted Law 4624/2019, implementing the GDPR and transposing into na-
tional Law, the Law Enforcement Directive 2016/680 (LED). Law 4624/2019 abolishes, 
with a few exceptions, former data protection legislation, namely Law 2472/1997.  
But what is Data Protection? According to Article 8 paragraph 1 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concern-
ing him or her.” Taking into consideration this Article, every person has the right to ac-
cess or delete his/her digital content and to be notified about whether information that 
refers to him/her as an individual, is being processed in any way. Hence, any entity that 
handles a subject’s information is obliged to perform these activities based on the indi-
vidual’s consent or any other legitimate basis. In Article 6 of the GDPR there is a detailed 
list which fully explains the grounds upon the processing of data is founded on a legiti-
mate basis. 
The categories of data that the GDPR aims to protect are the so called “personal data” as 
defined in Article 4(1) GDPR. According to the provided definition, “‘Personal data’ 
means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data sub-
ject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, lo-
cation data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physi-
ological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”. 
“Personal Data” are the following, for example:  
1. Personal information that uniquely identify a person (e.g. name), 
2. Communication Data, 
3. Sexual orientations, 
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4. Political opinions, 
5. Religious or philosophical beliefs, 
6. Health and genetic data, 
7. Racial and/or ethnic data, and 
8. Biometric data. 
Some of the above-mentioned information is considered “sensitive” and it alludes to an 
individual’s sexual, political, religious, health and racial information. In general terms, 
“sensitive data” are information that ought to be prioritized in cases of security breaches. 
Unauthorized access to this kind of information is forbidden (Article 9(1) GDPR). Expo-
sure of “sensitive data” is strictly undesirable [56]. The protection of this information is 
required due to ethical reasons or concerns related to an individual’s privacy. Therefore, 
the EU put into force solid regulations and severe penalties concerning personal “sensitive 
data”.    
Any entity that stores or processes personal data of a given subject is obliged to be com-
pliant with the GDPR. A “data subject” is the identified or identifiable natural person to 
whom the data relate (Article 4(1) GDPR). A “data controller” is the natural or legal 
person, public authority, Agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (Article 4(7) 
GDPR). Finally, a “data processor” is a natural or legal person, public authority, Agency, 
or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller (Article 4(8) 
GDPR). 
The Regulation provides several preconditions, mostly territorial, in which an entity is 
subject to the GDPR. According to Article 3 of the GDPR, the territorial scope of the 
Regulation has been extended and it applies to all EU-based controllers and processors, 
irrespective to the physical location of data processing. Additionally, the GDPR applies 
to all entities, which offer services or material goods to a “data subject” in the EU. Finally, 
the territorial appliance of the Regulation extends to entities that monitor data subjects’ 
behavior within the EU [57].      
According to the GDPR, the introduction of new terms, definitions and principles is new 
as well. These definitions are primarily linked to processing companies and their related 
activities. In particular, the Regulation has included new terms and principles concerning 
processing like: “transparency” and “accountability” (Article 5) and “Processing which 
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does not require identification.” (Article 11). Moreover, it has implemented new defini-
tions such as: “pseudonymization”, “data protection policies” and “data breach”. The 
fundamental principles of the Regulation are seven (7) and they are the ones depicted in 
Figure 12 [58]. Ultimately, the most significant impact of the Regulation, is the induction 
of countermeasures against unlawful and irrational data processing. These countermeas-
ures are described in the embedded Articles describing the rights of data subjects and 




For data to be processed lawfully, the processing must comply with one of the lawful 
grounds for making data processing legitimate, listed in Article 6 GDPR for non-sensitive 
personal data, and in Article 9 GDPR for special categories of data (or sensitive data). 
Last but not least, it is of outmost necessity to mention, once more, that whenever a com-
pany processes information in an unlawful way, it might be held accountable for it and 
be fined for its violations. These violations can be due to an action or a negligence of the 
entity in question. According to Articles 58 and 83 of the GDPR, the competent supervi-
sory authority of a member state (in Greece it is called “Hellenic Data Protection Author-
ity”) has the power to investigate and to fine any entity which does not abide by the legal 
provisions.  
Moreover, the GDPR has introduced a not so new concept for the purpose of handling 
data protection issues. This concept is known as the “Data Protection Officer” (DPO). 
“Data Protection Οfficers” are persons who advise on compliance with data protection 
rules in organizations undertaking data processing. They are considered ‘a cornerstone of 
accountability’ because they facilitate compliance. Furthermore, they function as inter-
mediaries between the supervisory authorities, data subjects and the organizations that 
appointed them.  
Figure 12: The seven basic 
principles in the GDPR 
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Taking into consideration all the facts mentioned above, one may conclude that the GDPR 
is a Regulation formed to protect individuals’ rights. As we live in an era in which eve-
rything is digitalized, it is essential for all entities to understand the importance of data 
protection and make their best efforts to ensure that no violations occur. As SMPs are 
essentially the major data generators in our “Information Era”, they are responsible for 
adopting the Regulation’s methods of protection and be compliant to it. 
It must be noted that the GDPR excludes from its scope data processing by competent 
authorities for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the preven-
tion of threats to public security (Art. 2(2)(d) GDPR) and paves the way for the so-called 
Law Enforcement Directive (LED), which applies to data processing by competent au-
thorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding 
against and the prevention of threats to public security. 
2.2.2 Data Protection through GDPR – Users’ Rights 
Since the popularity of SMPs has grown immensely over the past few years, like “Face-
book” or “Pinterest”, they are considered to be the online communication’s key media-
tors. Even though users are provided with many benefits, privacy related concerns have 
increased. The excessive use of SMPs has gradually led to the phenomenon of users los-
ing control over their personal data, to the point that an individual’s provided content is 
no longer considered as his/her private property [60]. To ensure that data controllers no 
longer make unnecessary processing of users’ data, the GDPR provides “netizens” with 
several protecting rights. All in all, these rights aim at giving individuals full control of 
the data related, in any possible way, to them.  
According to Article 12 of the Regulation, data processors and controllers are obliged to 
inform data subjects, at the time when personal data are collected about their intended 
processing. Plainly, GDPR compels entities to thoroughly inform the data subjects con-
cerning their personal data processing and to provide this information in a “transparent, 
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language”. Additionally, 
Articles 13 and 14 enlist the information that must be provided by the entities in question. 
These Articles represent a data subject’s “right to be informed”. 
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Moreover,  Article 15 has introduced the right of a data subject to access his/her personal 
information, processed by the data controller. Specifically, a user may inquire whether 
his/her personal information is being processed and in case s/he gets an affirmative re-
sponse, s/he has the right to access it, request and receive a copy “in a commonly used 
electronic form” and acquire any other additional information (reasons for processing, 
etc.). The period for providing the requested information is set to one month (Article 12(3) 
GDPR). As the title proclaims, Article 15 establishes “the right to access”. 
Articles 16 and 17 provide to data subjects’ the rights to “rectification” and “data eras-
ure” respectively. The “right to rectification” enables data subjects to request inaccurate, 
incorrect or incomplete information to be altered, in his/her desired way [61]. Conversely, 
with the “right for erasure”, the GDPR provides the conditions under which a data subject 
may obtain the deletion of his/her private information and refraining data processors/con-
trollers from additional distribution. The “right of erasure” is based on the “right to be 
forgotten principle” and its prerequisites consist of: (i) unnecessity of data processing, in 
relation to the original purposes, (ii) withdrawal of data subject’s consent, (iii) data sub-
ject’s objection to processing, (iv) unlawful process, (v) a legal obligation which demands 
the erasure of processed personal data and (vi) data were processed for the purpose of 
offering information society services to a child. Clearly, since many times requests for 
data erasure may exceed the purpose of the Regulation, the legislators have put into force 
several occasions in which organizations may deny erasing personal data. 
Furthermore, under the Regulation, restriction of processing should be considered suffi-
cient in some cases, instead of erasing the data. The “right to restriction of personal data” 
proposes an alternate to data erasure and it is performed in several instances, explicitly 
mentioned in Article 18 GDPR. Generally, data restriction is obtained in cases of unlaw-
ful processing, objection of processing by the data subject, acquisition of information by 
data subject for legal reasons and pending challenging of inaccurate data. In any event, 
according to Article 19 GDPR, the entity is obliged to inform the data subject before 
lifting the ongoing restriction.           
A new right provided by the Regulation is that of “data portability” (Article 20 GDPR). 
According to this right, data subjects are entitled to acquire data which have been pro-
vided to a controller (either by consent or contract), for automated processing. Also, the 
user may ask for these data to be directly transmitted from one entity to another. Surely, 
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the exercise of this right has once again some restrictions, mostly involving affecting 
rights and freedoms of others or distorting the “right to be forgotten”.   
Articles 21 and 22 provide the rights to a data subject, to “object data processing” and 
“not to be subject to automated individual decisions”. The first Article provides the right 
to object, meaning that a data subject may deny data processing for certain specified pur-
poses, in occasions related to his/her individual conditions. Article 22 provides re-
strictions regarding a user being subject to a decision-making, exclusively by automated 
processing of his/her data. In any case, Article 22 refers to situations where the automated 
processing is intended for evaluating the data subject’s personal aspects [62].  
In conclusion, the GDPR offers a wide range of protective measures to data subjects. As 
far as data processing and security are concerned, the legislators have introduced several 
obligations for the entities which are engaged in these forms of activities. The Regulation 
mandates that data controllers/processors are obliged to adopt the appropriate techniques 
and mechanisms which secure data subjects’ data and provide a legitimate data processing 
in general. In addition, a supervisory authority is to be established in every member state, 
which constitutes the institution that supervises and collaborates with all data control-
lers/processors, within the states’ territory. As already mentioned, the GDPR has also 
introduced a new role, that of the DPO, who is an organization’s advisor regarding data 
protection. Lastly, Articles 77-84 of the Regulation offer the ability to a data subject to 
lodge complaints and compel supervising authorities to take actions and fine entities, in 
cases of verified infringements of data protection.        
2.3 Social Media and GDPR 
Given the challenges of Web 2.0., the member states of the EU acknowledged the fact 
that the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC was obsolete and could not guard users suf-
ficiently anymore. GDPR’s being put into force required many updates regarding other 
EU regulations, and it was a procedure that kickstarted in 2012 [55]. With the enactment 
of the Regulation, natural persons were protected from unauthorized and unlawful pro-
cessing of their data. Still, the enactment of a legal text does not mean that privacy dilem-
mas disappear in a magical way.  
In subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the reasons behind implementation of improved storage 
techniques and databases have been analyzed. The vast amount of imported data led to 
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the deployment of those mechanisms, which on many occasions are performed automat-
ically. Since humans were simply not capable of handling the processed information, ma-
chines were brought into action. However, it is obvious that the software, the servers, and 
the data acquisition systems are handled by humans. Nobody should have the privilege, 
or on some occasions carry the burden, of having unlimited access to an individual’s pri-
vate information. Therefore, controllers/processors had to alter their policies and be con-
sistent with the Regulation. As SMPs constitute the content generator industry, by con-
structing enormous online communities, they were the first entities responsible for abid-
ing by the new rules and conform with the GDPR.        
2.3.1 Implementation of new Policies 
Internet companies have had enough time to realize that they should use safeguards in 
data collection. Limiting the storage of unwanted data and adopting international security 
standards should be their foremost concern. On the contrary, data misuse incidents were 
more than often, including data security breaches or unlawful transportation of data to 
unreliable third parties. One of the most impactful data breaches was that of “Yahoo!” in 
2014, where approximately 500 million user accounts were stolen [63]. Another major 
data breach was the one occurred in “LinkedIn’s” network in 2012, during which a Rus-
sian hacker named “Peace” exploited the SMP’s systems and sold the compromised data 
on a dark web marketplace [64]. Conclusively, these incidents led to the fact that as online 
communities expanded, users gradually lost control over their own data. Thus, by legis-
lating the GDPR, EU targeted at providing “cybernauts” with extensive control over their 
private information. 
“Pseudonymization” and “encryption” are the two key-factors that can potentially guar-
antee SMPs’ protection of users’ data. Albeit, these terms seem quite familiar in a com-
puter science community, implementation in such a vast data generator company, requires 
state of the art techniques and efficient data storage mechanisms. “Pseudonymization” is 
a widely known de-identification procedure, implanted by the GDPR, and is defined both 
as a data protection mechanism and a security measure, against unlawful access. Well 
known “pseudonymization” techniques are hashing, random number generator (RNG), 
tokenization, etc. [65]. 
“Encryption” of data is a technique of achieving “pseudonymization”. In computers’ 
science sphere, “encryption” of data is defined as the conversion of data from a readable 
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format to an encoded cipher. There are several methods applied in encoding and decoding 
data, mostly involving “Symmetric key cryptography” and “Asymmetric cryptography” 
[66]. Encrypting users’ data in SMPs is quite challenging, due to the “Big Data” theorem. 
Indeed, SMPs’ engineers have either created or applied the appropriate “encryption” 
schemes, as GDPR obligates them to do so. For instance, “Facebook” had originally se-
lected “Kerberos” system to encrypt users’ data, but in order to balance security and op-
erability of systems, the company implemented “Transport Layer Security” (TLS) [67]. 
Along with all other changes, SMPs had to alter their privacy policies. As defined by the 
Australian government: “A privacy policy is a statement that explains in simple language 
how an organization or agency handles a person’s personal information.” [68]. There-
fore, as SMPs handle users’ personal data extensively, they were obliged to inform them 
about the reasons and the proceedings of data processing. Implementation of a privacy 
policy is the solution to the principle of “transparency”, provided by the GDPR, and 
designates the first step that makes a SMP compliant to the Regulation. 
Privacy policy texts, created by SMPs are often overlooked, as they are too extensive or 
simply too boring for the average user. In fact, “Twitter’s” privacy policy is nineteen 
pages long [52], “Tumblr’s” is eight pages long [69], and so on. If in doubt, you can 
simply ask yourself, “Have I ever read a privacy policy document, or just clicked on the 
accept button?”. 
Although privacy policies should be easily comprehended by a user, they must cover the 
entire spectrum related to data processing. A standardized privacy policy text created and 
provided by a SMP, should contain explicit information corresponding to the following 
questions [70]: 
1. Who collects the personal data? 
2. Who uses the collected data? 
3. Which data are being processed? 
4. How long is the retention period? 
5. What is the reason for data processing? 
6. How can a user exercise his/her rights? 
7. What are the securities measures? 
8. Is the user notified when a change to privacy policy occurs? 
Provided that a privacy policy document answers these questions, it should be considered 
as GDPR compliant. 
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Even though, GDPR has come into force in 2018, there are still many entities which fail 
to comply. Some companies have not implemented well informed privacy policies, whilst 
others do not support mechanisms that respond to users’ queries. The main focus of SMPs 
should be strictly limited on providing users full control of their data. Along with a fully 
structured privacy policy, SMPs must deploy storage mechanisms that automatically 
erase data from all internal systems (after a certain retention period). Also, they must 
support techniques which allow data subjects to immediately access the processed data 
and be easily provided with a copy of them (easily handled requesting platforms and 
readable provided formats). Finally, as limited access and privacy of data are of outmost 
necessity, each SMP must adopt the appropriate encryption and access techniques that 





























3 Social Media Platforms and Law Enforce-
ment  
Social Media Platforms provide a variety of advantages to the public. Cybernetic com-
munities comprise a welcoming environment for all people. No-one is banned from reg-
istering; as long as users comply to a SMP’s terms of services, they can keep their 
uniquely identified profiles and enrich these societies with their distributed content. But 
beyond the majority of users who join a SMP to share knowledge, communicate with 
others, or enjoy its services in any possible way, there is a small percentage who will try 
to leverage its merits in order to gain unlawful profit. Lots of complaints have been lodged 
against users who have harassed or bullied others. Additionally, courts have tried several 
fraud-related lawsuits or to make things even worse, child sexual abuse/exploitation 
cases. It appears to be quite apparent that social media, and in specific SNSs, are potential 
goldmines for criminals. To deter these activities, SMPs have implemented quite a few 
reporting mechanisms in order to ban antisocial users. These mechanisms should be con-
sidered quite adequate when it comes to misdemeanors, like hateful speech or defamation. 
But what happens when a felony occurs? How do SMPs inform police authorities, for any 
impending criminal activities? And most importantly, how do law enforcers acquire the 
evidence of such a crime or the data of the cyber perpetrator [71]. 
Although in chapter 1 the definition of cybercrime and its general concepts have been 
provided, in this chapter this thesis will analyze the different types of cybercrime occur-
ring in SMPs. Cybercrime is a specialized form of crime and it is fed by the dynamism of 
cybersphere [72]. For over two decades, traditional criminals have realized the im-
portance of becoming active in cyberspace; but exploiting any system is not easy. Hack-
ing is the field of computer science that requires both programming/networking 
knowledge and flair. Thus, criminals that do not share the passion for computing, had to 
come up with other means of breaking the law. Sometimes they achieve their purposes 
and sometimes they do not. As cyber criminals and their practices have progressed a lot 
through time, police agencies had to keep up with their evolution, in order to protect cit-
izens’ rights. Apart from upgrading their skills, training and equipment, law enforcers 
were obliged to form an alliance with the entities which were responsible for controlling 
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almost every users’ data, globally. What these entities do is witness the blossom of cy-
bercrime and try to prevent it from occurring in its core. These entities are no others than 
Social Media Platforms.  
LEAs could not afford being absent from social media. It was simply not an option. This 
new reality of events was not just an outcome of rapid reproduction of different types of 
cybercrime. Society’s demands grew immensely, to the point that police’s traditional in-
vestigating and intelligence techniques were condemned as old-fashioned. Citizens ex-
pect police to be always one step ahead of criminals. Informing the public or arresting 
lawbreakers are mandatory actions that provide the public with the feeling of security. 
People expect faster reactions and effective handling of crime-related situations [73]. 
Since criminals realized that cybercrime is the future of gaining unlawful profit, they have 
become technologically aware and left the police fighting with petty theft and misde-
meanors. The use of SMPs can provide many benefits to all LEAs. Data acquisition, pub-
lic interaction and innovative investigation techniques, are merely some of the modern-
ized practices that bridged the gap between cybercriminals and the police.  
Police agencies use SMPs in three main areas: engagement, intelligence and enforcement 
[74]. Engagement is the field which covers LEAs’ interaction with the public. Nowadays, 
communication is the key to all aspects of life. Police needs this communication. Apart 
from informing society about their practices, they need to be engaged too. People’s pro-
vided information could be vital in solving all sorts of incidents. Engagement via SMPs 
is very important, as it should provide police officers with the opportunity of influencing 
the public and widening their access to the community [75]. Moreover, an uploaded post 
in any SMP, can provide multiple safety related advice, concerning impending cyber-
crimes, inspire people to be aware of any criminal activity in their community and to 
propose methods in order to minimize the risks. A noted example is the “Twitter” account, 
set up by the Hellenic Cyber Crime Unit, as depicted in Figure 13, through which the 
Police Agency provides all sort of information to its followers, who can read and share it 
at the click of a button, spreading the news to a large number of people. All in all, en-
gagement provides quick and effective communication between Police and the public.  
Intelligence and enforcement are the two areas which will be thoroughly studied in this 
chapter. SMPs attract users from all walks of life and store their data in their systems. As 
priorly explained, the “Big Data” phenomenon has led to the creation of many concerns 
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involving security and privacy of users’ information. Nevertheless, if manipulated intel-
ligently and elegantly, it can profoundly be considered as a significant tool in preventing 
and investigating cybercrime [76]. 
SMPs can assist any Police Agency in information gathering and intelligence, regardless 
if the Agency is involved in the cybercrime field or not. The networking platforms can 
assist in cases of locating people, who are either missing or intending to commit suicide, 
through the disclosure of geolocation data. Additionally, SMPs can be used by LEAs as 
a helpful tool to obtain information after the commitment of a crime. Viewing an uploaded 
video regarding a committed criminal activity on “YouTube”, or the recognition of a per-
petrator through his/her “Facebook” account are common practices. Lastly, as prevention 
of criminal behavior is of outmost necessity for all LEAs, policemen deploy SMPs in 
order to monitor criminal activity of the community they serve, by picking up leads and 
preparing for any potential incidents. In addition to these practices, CCUs regularly visit 
websites, known for propagating hate speech or used by registered sex offenders, in order 
to target vulnerable victims [77].  
Enforcement through SMPs is the key data acquisition method for CCUs. Through the 
following sections, the requests sent by LEAs in order to obtain data regarding unknown 
offenders, will be presented. As priorly mentioned, cyberspace offers anonymity to its 
users. Criminals tend to exploit this anonymity and remain unidentified while acting 
harmfully. Whereas other police agencies collapse, CCUs affiliate with SMPs and obtain 
Figure 13: Hellenic CCU’s Twitter Page, informing the public for the spread of mal-
ware via e-mail 
-40- 
 
data which, if handled accurately, can lead to the identification of the unknown perpetra-
tor. In addition, CCUs have either adopted or fashioned various investigative techniques, 
like “Open-Source Intelligence” (O.S.INT.), social digital forensics and social media pro-
filing, to support their public services. Gradually, collected IP addresses, registered e-
mail accounts, metadata and any other provided information from SMPs, along with the 
collaboration of national ISPs, can solve an investigation, which in any other occasion 
would be abandoned and filed as a “cold case” (i.e., an unsolved criminal investigation, 
that has stopped being actively pursued because of a lack of evidence [78]).  
3.1 Types of cybercrime on SMPs 
As the use of SMPs escalates on an exponential basis, cybercrime activities become more 
and more aggressive. Crimes against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of tar-
geted systems occur constantly. In chapter 1, this thesis has provided a historical preview 
of cybercrime along with its general concepts. Now it is time to present the most common 
criminal activities, committed in the heart of virtual communities: Social Media Plat-
forms.       
3.1.1 Personal Data Breach – Identity Theft 
Corresponding to FBI’s annual Internet Crime Report for 2019 [79], which derives from 
the records of IC3, personal data breach counted 38,218 victims, while identity theft 
counted 16,053 victims in the U.S.A. According to the report, “Identify theft involves a 
perpetrator stealing another person’s personal identifying information, such as name or 
Social Security number, without permission to commit fraud.” [79]. The commitment of 
identity theft does no longer require the criminal’s real-life interaction with his/her victim. 
SMPs and in particular SNSs, have provided unlimited resources for the occurrence of 
this criminal activity. Nowadays, as people post their personal data freely online (such as 
photographs, occupation, family status, addresses, etc.), they attract criminals’ attention 
who seek to forge official documents. The acquisition of these data, jointly with the use 
of technically specialized tools (e.g., reverse lookup), which are available on the Internet 
free-of-charge, may result in stealing a user’s identity.  
In EC3’s 2020 annual report [80], the organization has defined personal data breach 
(compromise) as “the ability of criminals to access individual user credentials or to ac-
cess large databases with potentially valuable information.”. After the legislation of the 
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GDPR, the act of compromising someone’s personal data is considered quite heinous. 
The regulation obliges companies to report these kinds of breaches, as the protection of 
EU’s citizens personal information is deemed extremely important [80]. A distinctive ex-
ample of a data breach criminal activity is the incident that took place in “Twitter’s” net-
work, in 2020, where a seventeen-year-old hacker breached the SNS’s infrastructure and 
compromised dozens of accounts, belonging to several high-profile users (politicians, ce-
lebrities, entrepreneurs, etc.). In the end, the hacker and his accomplices managed to steal 
over 118,000$ worth of bitcoins (BTC) and exposed the infrastructure vulnerabilities of 
the platform [81] [82]. 
3.1.2 Cyberterrorism – Cyberthreats 
As SMPs are widely used for the commitment of any sort of traditional crime (theft, sex-
ual abuse, identity theft, espionage, etc.), violators tend to take advantage of cyberspace, 
in order to convey their hate speech and threaten others. When it comes in defining and 
categorizing cyberterrorists, the motivations behind the reproduction of hate speech are 
irrelevant. Usually, these acts of hate are caused by moral, religious, political or any other 
related ideas. The term was originally coined by Barry Collin, in 1980, and it still of use 
nowadays, having different meanings, depending on the nation or field of science that 
describes it [83]. Cyberterrorism is defined, by the IC3’s annual report, as “Violent acts 
intended to create fear that are perpetrated for a religious, political, or ideological goal 
and deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants.” [79]. This definition 
is closer to the term cyberthreat, where users from distinct background, tend to pose im-
minent threats to a group of people who do not share their point of views regarding reli-
gion, politics or even sports. Cyberthreats are typically made in order to generate hate 
speech, by people who hide behind their screens and try to avoid personal confrontation. 
Therefore, violators rarely deliver them in practice.     
In contrast, cyberterrorism applied in SMPs, has a different connotation. It involves the 
cyberattack, executed to penetrate a specific target, from all connected internal or external 
networks, by a group of people who share the same motivations. SMPs and the establish-
ment of virtual communities, have created the appropriate background for the blossom of 
cyberterrorism. The relative ease of access, accompanied with the low-cost provision of 
services, deliver   a suitable environment, through which terrorists can forward their vio-
lent extremism, beyond the borders of their countries [84].  
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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in its report on online terror-
ism, has categorized the main areas of cyberterrorism’s utilization of SMPs, and Internet 
in general [85]. These categories are: 
1. Propaganda. Terrorists recruit SMPs to spread their message and make the public 
sympathize with them. They try to justify their cause, by uploading videos, presen-
tations, virtual messages, etc., through which they dare to enforce their perspective 
and recruit followers globally. 
2. Financing. Another use of SMPs is the raise of funds to finance the acts of terrorism. 
Generally, terrorists ask for donations from SMPs’ users, through direct messaging, 
advertisements, or any other available service. Funding is usually completed with 
cryptocurrency or any other virtual payment method. 
3. Training. Recruits’ training is often achieved with the utilization of SMPs. After the 
procedure of engaging users with the purpose of recruiting them, terrorist organiza-
tions tutor and train their followers to perform cyberattacks and provoke them to 
improve their combatting skills. 
4. Planning. Remote communication is the key to a successful terrorist attack. As ter-
rorists target critical technical infrastructures of their victims, secrecy and flawless 
coordination are of outmost necessity. In addition, social-engineering techniques are 
deployed, in order to gather vital information, related to the potential target.     
5. Execution. Every single element described in the above-mentioned categories, may 
be enacted when it comes to the execution of a cyberterrorism act.   
6. Cyberattacks.  They are performed with the ultimate goal of exploiting the vulnera-
bilities of the target’s computer system, penetrate it and finally, launch the designated 
attack. Cyberattacks may involve acts like website defacement, Ddos attacks, mal-
ware, hacking, etc.  
Concisely, SMPs offer cyberterrorists the means of spreading their vile ideas, more rap-
idly and efficiently. Hence, LEAs and SMPs have to take drastic shielding countermeas-
ures to protect the public, from these kinds of violent acts. 
3.1.3 Cyberbullying and Cyberstalking 
At some point, every single person has been a victim of bullying or harassment. Bullying 
is a widely known term, used to explain the “ongoing and deliberate misuse of power in 
relationships through repeated verbal, physical and/or social behaviour that intends to 
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cause physical, social and/or psychological harm” [86]. The rapid development of SMPs, 
jointly with the given purpose of every SNS, which is no other than the establishment of 
online communities through the facilitation of users’ communication, have enabled the 
mass and effortless misbehaviors of bullying violators. SMPs are regularly exploited by 
bullies, to terrorize, threaten and distress other users. It may seem quite insignificant, but 
due to the unknown psychological background of the victims, these acts have occasion-
ally led to self-harm, violence and, in extreme situations, suicide [87]. 
Due to the massive increase of hate speech, through cyberbullying, many countries have 
taken drastic measures in order to prevent these criminal acts and assist victims. In the 
U.S.A., the Cyberbullying Research Center, was launched in 2005 from Dr. Sameer Hin-
duja and Dr. Justin W. Patchin, to educate adolescents, parents and law enforcers, regard-
ing cyberbullying and cyberstalking [88]. Moreover, in the United Kingdom (U.K.), the 
National Bullying Helpline is a charitable organization, founded in 2003 in order to pro-
tect and inform the public. According to the U.K.’s organization, “Cyberbullying is bul-
lying online and any form of anti-social behaviour over the internet or via a mobile de-
vice. It is an attack or abuse, using technology, which is intended to cause another person 
harm, distress or personal loss.” [89]. In addition, SMPs have implemented their own 
forums and help centers, to help and support victims. In particular “Facebook” has created 
the “Bullying Prevention Hub” [90], which is a portal through which the SNS provides 
guidance and prevention suggestions on how to take precautions, not only to underage 
users, but also to their parents. 
While cyberbullying is the broadly accepted term, cyberstalking is a deviant behavior that 
is usually mistaken as an act of cyberthreat or cyberbullying. Despite the fact that cyber-
stalking definitions vary, a general description of the term is provided by the FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, as follows: “The term “cyberstalking” is used to refer to the re-
peated use of the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic communications devices to stalk, 
annoy, alarm, or threaten a specific individual or group of individuals” [91]. Although 
cyberstalking is undoubtedly a main form of cyberbullying, it differentiates due to the 
fact that cyberstalking is a behavior which explicitly aims at making the victim feel ex-
tremely concerned about his/her safety and causing feelings of emotional anxiety, stress 
or frustration [92]. Predators tend to cyberstalk their victims, through SMPs, by tracking 
down their information from their posts, sending them numerous text messages or posting 
about them, on their personal profiles, without their permission. 
-44- 
 
3.1.4 Social Engineering and Phishing 
According to ENISA, “Social engineering refers to all techniques aimed at talking a 
target into revealing specific information or performing a specific action for illegitimate 
reasons.” [93]. In plain terms, social engineering is the act of obtaining any kind of in-
formation, with or without the use of technological skills. Personal information is today’s 
currency. The growth of SMPs and the wide spread of their fundamental services amongst 
their users (content uploading, provision of personal information, etc.) has facilitated the 
vast development of social engineering. “Scammers” (i.e., one who perpetrates a scam 
or a person who commits or participates in a fraudulent scheme or operation [94]), either 
use psychological manipulation to gather information related to a future target or deploy 
specific types of high-tech techniques (e.g. phishing), in order to exploit a user’s personal 
information to obtain unlawful profit (e.g. obtaining credit card credentials, to steal a 
user’s money).  
The psychological manipulation of the target usually derives from his/her need of human 
interaction or the conversational skills of the attacker. From a certain point of view, scam-
mers are talented manipulators who have perfected the art or conversation significantly. 
Thus, people tend to trust them with their secrets, even though they do not know them in 
person. The act of social engineering does not constitute a criminal act by default, albeit 
the criminal activity occurs when the obtained information is used in an unlawful way 
[3]. In Figure 14, “ZeroFox SaaS Technology” has created a social engineering attack 
scheme related to a scam, which had taken place against an enterprise. In this scheme, the 
scammer has deployed specific technological techniques, such as the infection of a com-
mon .pdf file, with a phishing tool. 
Social engineering consists of various forms of techniques, such as pretexting, baiting, 
quid pro quo and tailgating. Phishing/spear phishing is a more sophisticated technique 
used for social engineering, which requires high-level technical skills, in order to either 
develop or deploy the appropriate tools. In IC3’s annual report, phishing is the most fre-
quently reported criminal activity, counting 114,702 victims in the U.S.A. [79]. 
-45- 
 
Phishing attacks are described as “a means 
to persuade potential victims into divulging 
sensitive information such as credentials, 
or bank and credit card details.”, while 
“spear phishing is a more sophisticated 
and elaborate version of phishing. It tar-
gets specific organisations or individuals 
and seeks unauthorized access to confiden-
tial data.” [95]. Even though social engi-
neering, phishing or spear phishing tech-
niques can be performed through various 
systems or platforms, SMPs once more of-
fer a welcoming environment for the utili-
zation of these criminal activities. SMPs’ 
offered communication services, combined 
with the lack of users’ awareness, result in 
the provision of unlimited resources for 
online fraudsters and impostors.   
3.1.5 Malware 
Malware is a familiar term for most Inter-
net users, and it is a compound word, de-
riving from the words: malicious and soft-
ware. According to ENISA’s glossary, “Any piece of software that performs undesirable 
operations such as data theft or some other type of computer compromise can be catego-
rized as Malware.” [96]. A malware can be installed in a user’s computer, without his 
prior knowledge, and it is used as a technique to reveal personal information. This soft-
ware reproduces itself and spreads through a network, with the goal of infecting as many 
Figure 14: Τhe anatomy of an enterprise - So-
cial Media cyber-attack 
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machines as possible. SMPs attract criminals who seek to exploit systems with malware 
or viruses, as they list millions of users [3]. 
A basic concept of each SMP is the distribution of content. Malwares’ and viruses’ de-
velopers hide their destructive code behind (hyper-) links, attachments or messages, 
which constitute the main body of the shared content. Once a user responds to this con-
tent, the malware immediately infects the computer in use, as well as any other attached 
devices [76]. FBI’s annual Internet Crime Report for 2019 has reported 2,373 victims of 
malware/spyware/virus attacks [79].  
Penetrators have adopted many methods in order to deploy malware attacks. The main 
categories of malwares are: trojan, virus, worm and spyware [96].  
1. A Trojan or Trojan Horse (deriving from the ancient Greek myth of the Trojan War) 
is a type of malware which is disguised by its developer as a legitimate software, in 
order to persuade the targeted user to install it. As soon as the software is installed in 
the device, it “runs” the malicious code in the background. 
2. Virus is the type of malware which is attached to a program, a file or any other form 
of content. Once the victim opens the content or launches the infected program, the 
virus replicates itself and spreads from one device to another. Common practices of 
a virus infection are: Internet downloads, direct messages’ attachments or (hyper-) 
links, executables, etc. The fact that a virus requires a human action in order to spread 
is notable. 
3. A Worm is similar to a virus, due to the fact that both malwares spread from one 
computer to another. The main difference between them, is that while a virus requires 
a human action in order to spread, a worm can exploit a system’s vulnerabilities, 
without the former action of the targeted user. The most destructive computer worms 
of all times were: “ILOVEYOU”, “Code Red” and “Conficker” [97]. 
4. Lastly, a Spyware is a malware that spies on a user’s activities without his prior 
knowledge or consent. Usually, a spyware targets on unlawful data collection, activ-
ity monitoring or keylogging (i.e., a piece of software that records the signals sent 
from a keyboard to a computer usually for the purpose of gaining information about 




SMPs’ development has empowered the introduction of all forms of online frauds. Due 
to the formation of private groups and the ability to interact with other users through 
personal messages, organized crime has thrived and launched new forms of frauds or 
scams. Investment frauds, confidence/romance frauds, credit card frauds, lottery/sweep-
stakes/inheritance frauds, along with many more, comprise the majority of online scams 
conducted through SMPs and specifically through SNSs, like “Facebook”, “Twitter”, “In-
stagram”, etc. 
Investment fraud is a relatively new-found type of scam, through which the perpetrator is 
disguised as a successful investment advisor, eager to assist the potential investor to make 
large profit. The scam usually begins with an advertisement on a SMP, accompanied with 
an ostensibly innocent request for a user’s phone number or email. Once the users provide 
their contact information, the scammers get in touch with them, almost immediately. Fi-
nally, as the users are reassured that the investments are legitimate and profitable, they 
send their money straight away, without realizing that they have just lost a fortune [99]. 
Romance scams occur when criminals create fake profiles on SNSs, to track down other 
users’ profiles, belonging usually to either isolated or lonely people, with the intention to 
lure them into a romantic relationship and embezzle them. Scam artists often pretend to 
be high-ranking military officers or prominent medical doctors, who seek for money to 
pay either an urgent medical surgery or an unexpected legal fee [100]. IC3’s annual re-
port, counted 19,473 victims of confidence/romance frauds [79]. 
Credit card frauds are considered to be a type of identity theft, through which criminals 
use another person’s credit card credentials to make unlawful purchases or withdraw 
money from his/her bank account. IC3 reported 14,378 victims of credit card fraud, in 
2019 [79]. 
Lottery, sweepstakes and inheritance frauds belong to the same type of scams, for the 
reason that violators execute them by promising an unexpected and vast amount of money 
to SNS’s users. In exchange, users are simply obliged to pay for tax fees, legal or banking 
bills, etc. [101]. According to IC3’s report, FBI numbered 7,767 victims, in 2019 [79]. 
Depending on the type of fraud, scammers either claim to be lawyers from overseas, ad-
ministrating inheritance (inheritance fraud), or officials who are in search of the lottery 
winner (lottery fraud), or a grand contest’s representatives who have called to inform the 
victim about his/her surprising winning, even though s/he has never participated in any 
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contest (sweepstakes fraud). Unfortunately, the most common victims of these types of 
frauds are the elderly.  
3.1.7 Child sexual abuse/ exploitation 
SNSs offer the perfect environment for users’ interaction and sharing of content. As 2020 
is the year in which the whole world has been quarantined, SNSs provide the aspect of 
communication that lacks from every person’s life. While most people tend to use social 
media to communicate or simply relax, they can easily create a hazardous environment; 
especially in cases that it is used by people with sexual addictions or problematic behav-
iors.  
Nowadays, all adolescents possess high tech mobile devices and a registered account, 
possibly on every existing SNS. The exchange of context from one to another by using 
direct messaging is a daily routine. Whilst others limit the exchange of content in just 
sending funny photographs, there are teenagers who send pornographic images of them-
selves, to their mate. Sexting is an ordinary phenomenon. It is defined as “the sending of 
sexually explicit messages or images by cell phone” [102].The easiness in which this 
content is distributed or forwarded to other users, can produce devastating results. Minors 
do not seem to understand that by sending this kind of photographs, they circulate child 
sexual abuse/exploitation material.  
Another serious problem existing in SNSs is the presence of sexual predators. SNSs’ es-
tablished communities create countless lists of underaged victims for sexual violators. 
“Online Grooming is when a predator builds an online relationship with a child by giving 
compliments or a “shoulder to lean on” or sending gifts until the child trusts the preda-
tor.” [87]. Grooming is a criminal activity that needs an extended period of time to take 
place. The trust between the predator and the prey must be built with patience and reas-
surance. Thus, violators tend to work with multiple targets. When the victim feels com-
fortable and relaxed with the predator, then there is no turning back. Typically, offenders 
exploit their victims by either blackmailing them into sending nude content of themselves 
or performing sexual acts through a webcam. Afterwards, the obtained pornographic ma-
terial may be distributed or sold to other pedophiles [3].     
Child exploitation and child sexual abuse are considered to be the most hideous and 
shocking criminal actions occurring in cyberspace. As a result, LEAs collaboratively with 
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SMPs put on a lot of effort to eradicate the phenomenon of child sexual abuse/exploita-
tion. 
3.2 Information gathering – Intelligence and En-
forcement 
Crime is a natural consequence of every functional society. Social media consist the cy-
bernetic societies where crime thrives. Above and beyond the provision of innumerable 
merits, SMPs have greased the wheels for the endorsement of traditional crime to the 
realms of cyberspace. Criminal endeavors manipulate their users in order to embezzle 
them, steal their personal data, exploit their computer systems and harass them in any 
possible way. All in all, cybercriminals abuse SMPs for their own personal benefit. 
Therefore, besides LEAs, SMPs ought to take the appropriate countermeasures to protect 
their users and facilitate the identification of unknown perpetrators. In effect, SMPs have 
implemented two supplementary types of security measures, apart from informing their 
users about any potential criminal activity on a daily basis. First of all, SMPs have created 
their own reporting mechanisms, through which every user can report any impeding vio-
lation of the community’s terms of service. According to the reported violation, an em-
ployee, or an automated process of the SMP probes the grounds of the illicit activity and 
either bans the violator/user from using the platform or rejects the reporting. Additionally, 
SMPs have implemented their private portals, as shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16, 
through which LEAs can request a user’s processed data.  
Figure 15: Facebook’s online law enforce-
ment platform 





It is highly important to clarify that LEAs cannot request the disclosure of data of every 
registered user, without the former provision of proper justification. Police agencies’ re-
quests must be based on a legitimate ground, followed by a signed legal proceeding and 
limited to the investigated user. In addition, as most SMPs are established inside the 
U.S.A.’s territory, every request outside the country’s jurisdiction must be submitted ei-
ther through LEAs’ international channels or via the mutual legal agreements, signed 
amongst countries. There are few SMPs, like “Facebook” or “Twitter”, that comply to 
requests of non-U.S.A. police authorities, based upon their own policies.        
In chapter 2, the various types of data that SMPs automatically collect and process from 
their users have been thoroughly analyzed. Registered e-mail accounts, geolocation in-
formation, payment methods and networking data are merely some of them. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that a conventional police officer lacking the knowledge of making good 
use of this information may find it worthless, a cybercrime agent who has been trained to 
handle various aspects of computer science is more likely to discover an informational 
goldmine among them. 
3.2.1 Preservation Request 
The U.S.C., Title 18, § 2703 (f)(1), states that “A provider of wire or electronic commu-
nication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental en-
tity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession 
pending the issuance of a court order or other process.”. According to the Code, a gov-
ernment official is able to send a preservation request (either through a preservation letter 
or by using the implemented law enforcement preservation-request platform), in order to 
demand the SMP to preserve the records of the associated account. The social media en-
tities are obliged to preserve the data that exist at the time when the request is received, 
but do not retain the records of future provided information. Upon receiving the preser-
vation request, SMPs must keep the preserved records for up to a period of ninety days. 
Moreover, the government official may ask for a further extension of the preservation 
period. With any additional request, SMPs must keep the preserved data for another 
ninety days. 
Preservation requests are highly valuable for cybercrime agents. In brief, they initiate the 
investigation procedures and inform the SMP that a legal action has been taken, due to 
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the previous occurrence of an illegal activity. As SMPs’ user accounts are volatile, with 
the content and the provided information changing instantaneously, law enforcers seek 
for the preservation of data in order to ensure that evidence or information that may lead 
to the identification of an unknown perpetrator or the reconnaissance of a criminal activ-
ity, is not lost [3]. A preservation request may be submitted in two different ways. Either 
via the implemented law enforcement preservation-request platform (as depicted in Fig-
ure 17), or by filling up the preservation letter and sending it to the designated SMP 
(Figure 18). 
 
Figure 17: Preservation request via Fa-

















Subpoenas are the most commonly applied legal requests, by LEAs. Police authorities 
employ administrative subpoenas, authorized by “a Federal or State statute or a Federal 
or State grand jury” in order to disclose information about a SMP’s subscriber. A sub-
poena is defined as “a written order to compel an individual to give testimony on a par-
ticular subject, often before a court, but sometimes in other proceedings (such as a Con-
gressional inquiry). Failure to comply with such an order to appear may be punishable 
as contempt.” [103]. SMPs require the submission of a valid subpoena, linked to an on-
going official criminal investigation, in order to disclose basic record information. related 
to a subscriber’s account [104]. According to the U.S.C., Title 18, § 2703 I(2), SMPs shall 
disclose the following information to the competent authority:  
1. Name, 
2. Address, 
3. local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times 
and durations, 
4. length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized, 
5. telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including 
any temporarily assigned network address, and 
6. means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank 
account number). 
3.2.3 Court Order 
Court orders are the legal requests through which SMPs disclose the above-mentioned 
basic subscriber information (provided also through a subpoena), complemented with 
“certain records or other information pertaining to the account” [105]. The additional 
information provided “may include message headers and IP addresses”, but the content 
of the subscribers’ communications is strictly excluded from disclosure. A court order is 
defined as “a legal command issued by a judge or other judicial official” [106].  
Even though court orders can provide a lot of information, either for the probed subscriber 
or for the investigated criminal activity, they are not preferred by the police authorities as 
they require explicit justification for their issue [3]. Externally derived data found in a 
SMP’s user account may not always provide the solid evidence, which the issue of a court 
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order demands. Therefore, it may be extremely challenging for the investigator to prove 
that the data of the associated account must be disclosed, due to its connectivity to the 
investigation. In any case, LEAs have a propensity for taking these risks, as the provided 
information through the court order, may lead in the identification of the unknown per-
petrator [3]. 
It is clearly stated in many SMPs’ law enforcement guidelines that upon receiving of the 
court order, they may notify the subject of the investigative measures. Nevertheless, in 
cases where police authorities believe that the suspect’s notification could result in jeop-
ardizing the investigation, they can specifically include the prohibition of informing the 
user/suspect in the issued court order [107].  
3.2.4 Search Warrant 
Cornell Law School defines the search warrant, as “a warrant issued by the competent 
authority authorizing a police officer to search a specified place for evidence even with-
out the occupant’s consent” [108] and is required for a search under the “Fourth Amend-
ment” [109]. In summary, the “Fourth Amendment” states that a law enforcer asking for 
the issue of a search warrant, must provide the existence of “probable cause”, along with 
an explicit description of the “place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”. “Probable cause” usually exists, either when the current proof indicates the 
commitment of a criminal activity, or when the vital evidence that confirm the commit-
ment of a crime is present, in the “place to be searched”. While considering the fact that 
SMPs belong to the realm of cyberspace, it is easily understandable that the meanings of 
the terms, “place” or “things to be seized”, are quite vague. Hence, although probable 
cause is still a prerequisite for the issue of a search warrant, SMPs require the description 
of messages, photos, videos, timeline posts, and location information [105], instead of the 
clarification of a “place”, in order to accept the legal proceeding and disclose the re-
quested data. 
3.2.5 Requests from Foreign Authorities – Law correlation 
SMPs’ provided services, attract people from all over the world. Consequently, criminal-
ity on SMPs meets no physical borders. Violators, from any geographical location of our 
society, use and exploit SMPs’ systems, in order to fulfil their illegitimate purposes. To 
this extend, it is easily comprehensible that it is not only U.S.A.’s LEAs who seek for 
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assistance from SMPs. As perpetrators may reside anywhere around the world or, in ad-
dition act harmfully against any person globally, the fact that SMPs provide their aid to 
any kind of LEA worldwide should be considered highly crucial. Indisputably, there are 
many prerequisites which ought to be met by the foreign LEAs, such as the formality of 
the requests or the correlation of Law violations, between the national Laws of the “re-
questing authority” and the jurisprudence that abides the “receiver” SMP. As most SMPs 
have their core establishments in the U.S.A., the “Law correlation” refers to the correla-
tion between the contextually national Law and the U.S. Code.   
There are three approaches, in which foreign LEAs may enquire for users’ data from 
SMPs. Initially, police agencies can send a formal request to the competent national au-
thorities, via the international police channels (e.g., INTERPOL). However, under the 
applicable law, SMPs demand a signed legal proceeding in order to disclose users’ data. 
Subsequently, non-national authorities may enquire an issue of such a proceeding through 
formal requests [105], specified as a “Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request” or “letter 
rogatory”. Nevertheless, as both practices, formal legal requests and interaction through 
international channels necessitate tons of paperwork and time-consuming bureaucracy, 
many SMPs have developed their own law-enforcement platforms, through which LEAs 
can communicate directly with them. In any case, as the uncontrolled and unlawful dis-
closure of users’ data in any police authority is illegal, it is still requested that the LEAs, 
intricately inform the SMP regarding the ongoing investigation, as well as to provide a 
national signed legal proceeding.   
3.2.6 Exception – Emergency Data Request 
In explicit situations, either when there is an imminent threat of physical injury against 
individuals or missing person cases, SMPs have implemented specific procedures through 
which LEAs can request for an immediate disclosure of users’ data, in order to prevent 
the occurrence of such situations, without further delay [105]. Cases in which SMPs may 
provide directly the requested data are called “emergency cases” and usually involve 
child safety incidents, kidnaps of adults/minors, suicides, physical assaults and terrorist 
activities. Through the “emergency data request”, SMPs do not demand the provision of 
a signed legal form, as it is considered extremely time-consuming and could possibly 
result in the occurrence of the emergency.  
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In any case, as depicted in Figure 19, SMPs demand a detailed justification in order to 
disclose the requested data. The handler of the case, who is usually a law enforcement 
official, must provide specific details which distinguish a case as an emergency. Infor-
mation regarding the nature of the case and how the provided data would assist in the 
prevention of the emergency are of outmost necessity. However, as this procedure relies 
upon the good faith of the SMPs, if the law enforcement official fails to provide the proper 
justification or proof, that would characterize the case as an “emergency”, SMPs may 
refuse to disclose the requested information. 
 
3.3 Investigations through Social Media 
Up to this point, we have thoroughly analyzed the implemented data disclosure platforms 
and legal proceedings, that SMPs have adopted in order to assist LEAs in identifying 
unknown online perpetrators. It can be easily concluded that SMPs, in accordance with 
the applicable law, have introduced all the appropriate mechanisms, analogous to every 
possible situation; either in times when the case involves an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion or an imminent threat of physical injury, SMPs will provide a user’s recorded data 
requested by the competent authority. At this point, it is important to explain that apart 
from the legitimate provision of users’ data, SMPs are considered to be information 
Figure 19: Emergency Request via Facebook’s platform 
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goldmines in the hands of an experienced and skilled cybercrime investigator. By deploy-
ing the suitable programs and investigating techniques, LEAs are capable of retrieving 
copious evidence related to a criminal activity [110].  
In chapter 2, we have thoroughly described the types of data that an average user may 
upload on his/her personal account. Even though criminals who create and use accounts 
on any SMP, are way too careful, regarding their shared content, there are specific data 
that can be obtained by a cybercrime agent and may possibly lead in the identification of 
the unknown perpetrator. Even if the investigated user/criminal has only one “friend” on 
his “Friend’s” list, a “reverse lookup function” may provide several information for the 
user at issue [111]. Furthermore, users’ profiles may easily provide several hidden “arti-
facts”, like pictures’ metadata or geolocation activity, which after being processed by the 
deployed software or open-source techniques, they can offer useful information. Publicly 
available information can be used in examining a criminal actor’s social or illegitimate 
activities. These sophisticated practices, along with the disclosure of a user’s private in-
formation from SMPs, can lead to the detection of unidentified violators and the solution 
of numerous unsolved criminal cases [110].     
Another major advantage that an online investigation of a user’s profile may provide is 
the so-called “Social Media Profiling” or “behavior prediction”. “Profiling” is a con-
cept, mostly related to the prevention of all kinds of criminal activities, rather than the 
identification of criminals’ identity per se. The extraction of personal information from a 
user’s profile may possibly lead to the prevention of a crime or, in many cases, the pre-
vention of situations where the investigated user tends to harm himself/herself. In any 
case, as “behavior prediction” derives from the analysis of a user’s personal provided 
content, LEAs must be very careful on how they use these practices. An individuals’ 
constant surveillance, who has not acted harmfully yet, can be characterized as an exploi-
tation of his/her social life. Thus, the investigated profiles must belong to users who either 
have a felonious record or belong to a group of people who are known for their criminal 
background [8]. In legal terms, the investigator must provide a “probable cause” in order 
to examine a user’s profile in any way. It has to be clarified that data processing occurring 
through “Profiling” is neither unlawful nor arbitrary. In the following subsection, the 
legal grounds upon which “Social Media Profiling” procedures are legitimately deployed 




3.3.1 Open-Source Intelligence (O.S.INT.) 
Before analyzing O.S.INT. for LEAs’ investigations, it is essential to understand what 
open-source intelligence actually involves. “Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is a con-
cept to describe the search, collection, analysis, and use of information from open 
sources, as well as the techniques and tools used. OSINT emerges out of a military need 
to collect relevant and publicly available information.” [113]. As the definition states, 
O.S.INT. is the method of extracting information from open sources, like the Internet, 
traditional mass media, photographs, etc. [114]. In general terms, these techniques are 
used in order to gather information related to an individual or the subject at issue. While 
O.S.INT. can be applied in any kind of means that provides content, cybercrime LEAs 
tend to utilize these methods on SMPs’ users’ profiles, as they provide various infor-
mation, in plain sight. It must be clarified that open-source gathered data, do not involve 
information that: “is classified at its origin, is subject to proprietary constraints (other 
than copyright), is the product of sensitive contacts with U.S. or foreign persons, or is 
acquired through clandestine or covert means” [115]. In any case, O.S.INT. practices do 
not require a user’s consent or prior knowledge, in order to extract or process the desired 
information.  
O.S.INT. supports the intelligence and investigation practices deployed by LEAs, in order 
to gather information that are not protected by privacy restraints. While the police inves-
tigators must manually indicate the searching and data crawling criteria, automated pro-
cesses (i.e., software) retrieve the coveted information. Contrariwise, whenever a LEA’s 
data analyst cannot predetermine the searching criteria, s/he may manually perform the 
O.S.INT. techniques on a user’s profile, in order to verify the existence of usable infor-
mation and deploy the desired software in later stages. Some of the most known O.S.INT. 
tools/software are namely: “Maltego”, “Recon-ng”, “theHarvester”, “Shodan” and “In-
telTechniques”. In addition, there are plenty O.S.INT tools, developed by private compa-
nies and used explicitly for data gathering from SMPs, like “Geotweet”, “FB Scan Tool” 
and “Google Plus Search” [116]. 
As LEAs are engaged in both prevention and investigation of criminal activities, data 
gathering is of outmost necessity. A police agent’s primary goal is to prevent the crime 
before its occurrence. For instance, a “Twitter’s” user public message declaring his/her 
plan to cause a riot or sell illegal covid-19 drugs on “Facebook” are data that can be 
gathered through O.S.INT. and can possibly lead to the prevention of other violations. 
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CCUs have reported many incidents, where SMPs’ users have announced their intention 
to commit suicide and were saved due to the existence of these techniques. Even if on 
some occasions, the public messages or uploaded content related to an imminent threat, 
have proven to be fraudulent or intended as jokes, data gathering through these practices 
has provided a lot of benefits and has literally saved numerous lives [115]. 
As priorly mentioned, data gathered through O.S.INT. can be also used for investigative 
purposes and the legal prosecution of perpetrators. By using the information extracted 
from SMPs’ accounts, cross-referenced with other data collected by public archives and 
investigation techniques (traditional policing), LEAs may gather the necessary evidence 
to arrest and legally prosecute a criminal violator. From a police agent’s perspective, the 
most challenging part of an investigation is the gathering of evidence that may possibly 
result in the legal prosecution of a criminal. Content shared through SMPs’ accounts is 
considered to be public data. In addition, content exchanged between two users or in a 
SMP group, may also be considered public, if one of the sharing users hands over it to 
LEAs. Evidence gathered through O.S.INT. is legit, as long as it is considered public and 
not forcibly extracted by the user-violator, with illegal means. Subsequently, one may 
easily jump to the conclusion that O.S.INT. techniques are utterly important. They pro-
vide content and information in an aggressive way, which would be impossible to be 
gathered in any other way [115].  
The issue that may arise from the extensive use of O.S.INT. software derives from the 
fact that these kinds of technologies are produced by private companies. For instance, 
“NiceTrack Open-Source Intelligence” is a tool developed by “Nice Ltd”, an Israel-based 
company, that “assists” LEAs and other intelligence organizations by using “mass inter-
ception solutions”. The software provided by “Nice Ltd”, retrieves relations and conver-
sation content, through telephony, IP and satellite [117]. While the “Nice Track Open-
Source Intelligence” products are developed specifically for LEAs, there other companies 
that produce different types of O.S.INT. tools and are available to everyone. Data ac-
quired through these types of software, are usually considered to be private by the users 
that unwillingly provide them, but in reality, they are publicly accessible either from the 
private companies that develop them or from the average users that apply them. The de-
velopment of new information technologies, involving data gathering through O.S.INT., 
is considered to be extremely important for LEAs, due to the fact that they can possibly 
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minimize all types of cyber threats. Nevertheless, the fact that users’ private data are dis-
tributed to third-part companies and everyday users is an issue that can potentially grow 
a lot of legal concerns [115].     
The implementation of O.S.INT technologies and their introduction to LEAs circles is yet 
in a developmental stage. There are two main reasons that impede the full implementation 
of these techniques. First of all, many officials have raised their concerns regarding the 
social costs. Virtual communities were created in order to provide users with a safe envi-
ronment, where they can confine their thoughts and socialize with others, without being 
surveilled by anyone. In a way O.S.INT. obliterates this essence of communicational pri-
vacy and enforces an online monitoring among SMPs. Truly, the idea behind this concept 
is to guard users against criminals. But the question remains. Who can amenably deter-
mine whether online surveillance through O.S.INT exceeds its purpose [115]? In addition, 
law enforcement agents are not yet qualified to either process the acquired information or 
handle the deployed software. As SMPs are continuously changing their interfaces in or-
der to satisfy their users, police agents involved in data gathering are obliged to follow 
these changes. Many LEAs around the world are proclaimed to be understaffed or handled 
with too many responsibilities. Hence, the endless training on O.S.INT. tools and tech-
niques is deemed a luxury that many LEAs simply cannot afford.     
3.3.2 Social Media Profiling 
SMPs, by their nature, encourage their users to express their thoughts and create groups 
in their digital worlds. Apart from communicating with others, SMPs provide services 
through which users can share content, by exchanging and redistributing all kinds of in-
formation. “Netizens” become members of large online communities and socialize with 
others, with whom they share common opinions, interests, religious or political beliefs, 
etc. Social relationships are the key aspects of all SMPs, as users expose their personali-
ties and share information related to their everyday lives. Nowadays, it seems more ra-
tional for someone to reveal his/her private thoughts on his/her “Facebook” account, ra-
ther than expressing them to a close friend. According to the uploaded content or dis-
closed personal information, “Friends” lists or most viewed videos, users can be catego-
rized and clustered in different groups, depending on their social, economic, religious, 
political or any other possible, statuses. This categorization is called “Users’ Profiling” 
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or “Social Media Profiling” and can be utilized for various purposes, like targeted adver-
tising, maximizing a SMP’s user experience, building of social relationships, threat pre-
diction or cyber forensics analysis [8].  
“Criminal Profiling” is defined as “a technique whereby the probable characteristics of 
a criminal offender or offenders are predicted based on the behaviors exhibited in the 
commission of a crime.” [118]. While this forensic technique is applied in most conven-
tional investigating practices, modern cybercrime investigators have tried to implement 
it on various occasions. “Criminal Profiling” in traditional police investigations, relies on 
tangible evidence and constant surveillance of the suspects at issue. “Social Media Pro-
filing” for police investigations, seems quite feasible, due to the fact that users/criminals 
tend to share and expose the desired information on their own. As mentioned above, users 
register in SMPs with the outmost goal of sharing content and private data. Thus, an in-
vestigator who is keen on criminal-profiling methods, can easily extract the desired data 
and predict possible threats or forthcoming criminal activities. Nevertheless, the process 
of online “Criminal Profiling” is much more challenging, as digital evidence can be 
forged by the violator. This fact can ultimately jeopardize the whole police operation 
[119]. 
Users’ shared content and private information offer a considerable amount of useable 
information, that would be obscured in any other way. LEAs seek to extract it in order to 
discover possible correlations or patterns, associated with any impending threat. Police 
agents employed in the field of “Criminal Profiling” aim to “connecting the dots”, by 
mining the voluntarily provided information. Depending on the patterns, users are as-
signed and clustered in specific categories. In later stages and after the classifications, 
LEAs try to predict misbehaviors that may trigger disastrous results. For example, hackers 
are categorized as “white, middle-class, obsessive antisocial males between 12 and 28 
years old, with an inferiority complex and a possible history of physical and sexual 
abuse” [120]. It is quite noticeable, that an individual’s personal characteristics, like the 
age or the economic status, can be easily extracted by the provided content and the per-
sonal information existing on a user’s account on any SMP. Even though stereotyping 
felons by studying past offenders is not actually valuable for an investigation, the classi-
fication of users according to their criminal past or correlation with other criminal users, 




The ultimate purpose of “Social Media Profiling” in cybercrime investigations is to iden-
tify and understand the criminal. As cybercriminals are keen on hiding their trails, the 
above-mentioned practices are not deemed as simple as they appear to be. The role of the 
investigators who are engaged in “Social Media Profiling” is not to unravel the mystery 
of the crime itself, but to assist investigators in piecing together the collected evidence. 
Through profiling methods, LEAs attempt to discover the links between criminals and 
criminal activities. The “cybertrails” (i.e., a trail of evidence, etc., on the Internet or in 
cyberspace [121]) collected after the occurrence of a criminal activity, accompanied with 
the statistical analysis and the categorization of suspects/users may easily bridge the gap 
in many cold cases. The analysis of the “modus operandi” (i.e., a distinct pattern or 
method of operation that indicates or suggests the work of a single criminal in more than 
one crime [122]) and the identification of the motives behind the criminal act, can reveal 
the personality of the perpetrator. In general, profiling can produce frameworks, which 
will set the examples for future recognition of potential online criminal actors [123].        
Apart from extracting users’ data, “Social Media Profiling” demands constant observa-
tion and surveillance of the user under investigation. Governments and LEAs are on many 
occasions accused of violating the fundamental rights of individuals. Users may be stig-
matized and classified in groups, according to their everyday activities, personal likes and 
dislikes, etc. “Social Media Profiling” means that the user who is being analyzed and 
categorized will be subjected to further official or unofficial police investigation. Irra-
tional profiling or utilization of these practices, by untrained investigators, may possibly 
lead to the phenomena of social inequality and prejudice against minorities or underpriv-
ileged groups [8]. Overall, “Social Media Profiling” in cyberspace is a valuable “tool”, 
which must be treated with caution and handled by experienced police investigators. 
In sum, as all stages of “Social Media Profiling” constitute processing of users’ personal 
data and are deemed “automated decision making” techniques, they are legislated by the 
LED and in specific by the Article 11(1), which explicitly states that: “Member States 
shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or significantly affects 
him or her, to be prohibited unless authorised by Union or Member State law to which 
the controller is subject and which provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and 
freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part 
of the controller.”. Hence, apart from all above mentioned, LEAs must be extremely 
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careful on how they implement these practices. It is crucial that the police agents, in 
charge of handling “Social Media Profiling” procedures, rely solely on automated pro-
cesses (i.e., software) for the “decision making” analysis, in order not to fall out of the 
scope of the jurisprudence [112]. 
3.3.3 Social Cyber Forensics 
Due to the endless and almost uninterrupted development of information technology, cy-
bercrime’s explosion is deemed to be uncontrollable. Cybercriminals are equipped with 
tools and various mechanisms on the Internet, as in the real world, that make their detec-
tion and prosecution challenging for most LEAs. The collection of evidence in cyber-
space, along with the investigation of cybercriminal activity is very complicated and apart 
from many years of experience, it requires a deep knowledge of the cyberspace itself. 
Hence, specialized police agents and professional engineers have implemented “cyber 
forensics”, in their fight against cybercrime. “Cyber forensics” or “digital forensics”, is 
defined as “the process of acquisition, authentication, analysis and documentation of ev-
idence extracted from and/or contained in a computer system, computer network and dig-
ital media.” [124]. “Digital forensics” is a continuously evolving scientific field that in-
volves numerous techniques. Namely, some of them are: “cross-drive analysis”, “live-
analysis on volatile data”, “recovery of deleted files” and “stochastic forensics” [125].  
One of the most critical stages of a criminal investigation, is the acquisition of evidence, 
that either identifies the unknown perpetrator, or verifies the existence of a criminal ac-
tivity. “Cyber forensics” is the field of expertise that is utilized by LEAs in order to gather 
and analyze the data that will be potentially used in a legal trial. “Cyber forensics” is not 
a brand-new scientific field. It has been applied in LEAs for over three and a half decades 
and the tools employed by the police agencies have evolved a lot through all this time. 
The first digital forensic tools can be traced back in the early 1980s, when they were 
mostly used by government agencies. Since then, software engineers have made a great 
progress in order to make them more advanced. Nowadays, they are used in both public 
and private sector, for reasons of data gathering. Furthermore, modern digital forensic 
software provides its user with a plethora of visualization capabilities, which make the 
procedure of analyzing information, much more easier [126].     
“Social Cyber Forensics” (SCF), is a specialized “digital forensics” field of expertise, 
applied on SMPs, and is defined as “as a branch of cyber forensics which is the process 
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of investigating the relationships among “entities” and revealing the digital connections 
among them in social media space by extracting/collecting metadata associated with their 
social media accounts, e.g., affiliations of the user, geolocation, and IP address.” [127]. 
According to this definition, an “entity” is any individual, organization, or group, that 
can be considered as an information provider, such as a SMP user [127]. SCF tools can 
collect data from SMPs in various ways. For example, forensics investigators can employ 
certain types of software or specific tools, to gather the information they seek, like col-
lecting information by using “Application Programming Interfaces” (APIs), crawling 
data/artifacts from local web browser cache or sniffing on unencrypted Wi-Fis (active 
attacks). Additionally, other designated investigative practices, for data acquiring, in-
volve collecting metadata from SMPs’ profiles, like IP addresses, timestamps, geoloca-
tions, registered personal information, relationships and affiliations, etc. Usually, 
metadata acquiring is achieved by using specific forensic tools, but on some occasions 
more skilled investigators prefer a hands-on approach [126].  
For a forensic analyst to be able to retrieve the required data and to determine the rela-
tionships and affiliations among the various “entities”, the existence of a “seed” is essen-
tial. “Seed” is an “initial knowledge”, which is used in order to scrutinize an entity. A 
“seed” can be any kind of information which can uniquely identify an entity; from IP 
addresses, to “Facebook” accounts or web tracker codes (WTC). In general, a “seed” is 
the information that a SCF tool requires, in order to initiate the examination and reveal 
the concealed data related to the investigated entity [127]. For example, a “seed” can be 
a “Facebook” account’s URL, as it can uniquely identify the user of the profile.          
At this point, it is extremely important to mention that O.S.INT and SCF techniques are 
in a certain way codependent. Traditional forensic practices necessitate the actual exist-
ence of the physical evidence, which are to be examined. With the extensive use of SMPs, 
users/criminals provide the desired evidence and data on their personal accounts [128]. 
Thus, LEAs can obtain the necessary information via O.S.INT. and analyze it with SCF. 
To this extend, many tools developed for SCF investigations, are also deployed for 
O.S.INT. practices. For instance, Maltego, which is a tool widely used by all LEAs, was 
developed for both O.S.INT. and SCF reasons [126]. At first, the aforementioned tool 
collects a vast variety of data from unlimited open sources and then, it analyzes the real-
world interconnections of the data, between all possible entities, from different SMPs like 








4 Inside a Cyber Crime Unit – The Hellenic 
Paradigm  
The Hellenic Cyber Crime Division (CCD), which is established in Attica Greece, reports 
to the Hellenic Police Headquarters and is supervised and monitored by the Chief of the 
Hellenic Police. Its local jurisdiction extends throughout the Hellenic territory. Τhe mis-
sion of the CCD is the detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses com-
mitted either through the Ιnternet or through other means of electronic communication 
and digital storage mediums. In particular, the Agency’s mission involves the detection 
and prosecution of crimes committed against minors, as well as the handling of cases 
regarding illegal intrusions and destruction/alteration or illegal circulation of software, 
hardware, digital data and audiovisual means, throughout the country. Moreover, the 
CCD provides assistance to the competent state’s authorities in order to prevent suicides 
announced via the Internet, as well as to other authorities that investigate cases of finan-
cial crimes, and in particular, crimes committed against the financial interests of the pub-
lic and national economy in general, or show the characteristics of organized crime, in 
accordance with the applicable legislation. The mission of the Cyber Crime Subdivision 
of Northern Greece (CCSNG), which is based in Thessaloniki, is identical to the central 
CCU’s mission and its jurisdiction extends to the region of the General Division of Secu-
rity of Northern Greece. 
During 2019, the LEA has developed numerous actions, regarding both the prosecution 
of crimes committed via the Internet and informing the country’s citizens about issues 
related to browsing Internet safely. Moreover, the CCD has cooperated with other com-
petent authorities of the Hellenic Police (Public Security Division, Forensics Investiga-
tion Division, Division of Information Management and Analysis, Training and Human 
Resources Development Division, etc.). The participation of the Division’s police agents, 
in various training seminars of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Train-
ing (CEPOL), EUROPOL and INTERPOL, as well as in meetings, conferences and sym-
posiums organized by European and international organizations, and held either in Greece 
or abroad, is highly increased. The Division also participates in the following interna-
tional actions:  
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i. in the International Police Operation to Combat Card Fraud in the Aviation 
Sector (GAAD - Global Airport Action Days), 
ii. in the International Police Operation to Fight Card Payment Fraud in the E-
Commerce Sector (eCommerce Action), under the coordination and support of 
EUROPOL, and  
iii. to the European Money Mule Action (EMMAV), with the support of EURO-
POL, Eurojust and the European Banking Federation (EBF). [129] 
The implementation of the "Cyber Alert" Internet Risk Management Center, which oper-
ates on a 24-hour basis and where specialized police officers of the Division report citi-
zens' complaints, is quite remarkable. This information, along any other complaints, are 
submitted either through the Division’s call center, via e-mails, or through the Division’s 
developed digital applications for mobile devices "Cyberkid" and "Feel Safe" or even 
through the web portal of the Hellenic Police, where citizens, businesses and organiza-
tions have the opportunity to submit complaints, related to any form of electronic crime 
(e-crime). With this modernized operation of the "Cyber Alert" center, the immediate 
service and information of the citizens is attempted. This way, people are provided with 
the opportunity to choose between various ways of communication with the CCD re-
motely and at any time. From 01/01/2019 to 31/12/2019, a total of one thousand, one 
hundred and twenty-three (1,123) cybercrime complaints had been submitted, while one 
hundred and eight thousand one hundred and sixty-three (108,163) calls were received by 
the call center of the LEA [129].  
During 2019, the CCD handled five thousand one hundred and seventy-eight (5,178) 
criminal cases. Specifically, the LEA investigated three hundred and twenty-nine (329) 
cases related to child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of minors through the Internet. 
Statistically, 39% of the victims were under 15 years old and 61% over 15 years old, 
while 82% of the victims were female. Also, 17% of the perpetrators were minors (aged 
12 years), while 83% of the perpetrators were adults, aged 18 to 87 years. Finally, 90% 







Table 1: Criminal Cases and related offences. 
Category CCD CCSNG Total 
Internet Fraud / E-Commerce 1.547 228 1.775 
Personal data / Threat / Defamation 829 156 985 
Illegal access & Obstruction of operation of in-
formation systems / Data Spying / Violation of 
privacy of communications, etc. and related of-
fenses 
192 46 238 
Child sexual abuse & Sexual Exploitation of Mi-
nors via the Internet 
293 36 329 
Animal protection legislation 156 14 170 
Intellectual property and subscription services of-
fenses 
13 4 17 
Gambling and online betting 15 4 19 
Intention for commitment of suicides 340 30 370 
Citizens' requests 500 174 674 
Assistance to local authorities 307 207 514 
Assistance in disappearance cases 32 9 41 
National Security / Espionage / Terrorism (via 
Internet) 
4 0 4 
Racism / Hate speech online 22 1 23 
Advertising, circulation of drugs, medicines and 
related illicit drugs online 
18 1 19 
 
In the context of international police cooperation (INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SIRENE), 
the Division received and handled one thousand, two hundred sixty-eight (1,268) coop-
eration requests. There were requests posed related to cases of transnational cybercrime 
police investigations, requests by domestic authorities for the investigation of crimes 
committed on the Internet, requests by foreign authorities for crimes committed via the 
Internet (through EUROPOL-INTERPOL), requests in order to provide assistance to Eu-
ropol's European Union Internet Referral Unit (EUIRU), and requests posed for providing 




Totally, in 2019, the CCD and the CCSNG, have both arrested and criminally prosecuted 
thirty-nine (39) people, as depicted in Table 2 [129]. 
Table 2: Arrests of the CCD. 
Criminal Offence Arrested 
Gambling and online betting  2 
Intellectual Property 3 
Fraud/Computer Fraud 1 
Child sexual abuse/exploitation 27 
Personal Data 2 
Illicit drugs online 1 
Circulation of drugs/ medicines 1 
Criminal cases related to antiquities  1 
Criminal cases related to weapons 1 
 Total 39 
 
Executing the mission of the Hellenic Police, which is the prevention and eradication of 
criminality in general, the Hellenic Police Headquarters and the Cyber Crime Division 
have developed a set of innovative actions. These actions are considered to be important 
pillars in the prevention and fight against cybercrime. What is more, they totally 
strengthen the field of engagement of the Hellenic Police in order to embrace society. To 
this extend, the CCD organizes workshops and lectures throughout Greece, aiming to 
inform students, parents, educators, consumers, traders and entrepreneurs about the risks 
associated with new technologies, online shopping, cyberbullying, and to address the dan-
gers lurking on SNSs, etc. In summary, during 2019, the Division organized and carried 
out five hundred and fifty-two (552) lectures throughout Greece. 
Additionally, the CCD has developed its own websites, titled “CyberAlert” [130] and 
“Cyberkid” [131] (Figures 20 and 21), through which the Agency provides counselling 
to the citizens about the safe use of the Internet in commercial transactions and online 
shopping. Also, the latter website, which is addressed to children and parents, provides 
useful information and tips for adolescents, teenagers, families and teachers on how to 
safely take advantage of the benefits of the Internet and to minimize any potential risks. 
Moreover, the public can be thoroughly informed about the dangers and the trends in the 
field of cybercrime, on an exponential basis. It is worth mentioning that the CCD has also 
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implemented two applications for smartphones, namely Cyberkid and Feelsafe, which 
have been both developed by the police force’s specialized personnel [129]. 
Figure 20: CyberAlert website 
Figure 21: Cyberkid website 
 
Likewise, along with the purposes of advising and providing information to the public, 
the Division has created accounts on various SMPs, such as “Facebook”, “Instagram”, 
“YouTube” and “Twitter”. The Agency has taken advantage of the merits offered by the 
SMPs, in order to engage with the Hellenic society in numerous ways, like interacting 
with the citizens, protecting them from any possible cybercrimes and directly receiving 
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information regarding any emergency situations. Namely, the Division’s accounts on 
SMPs are: “Facebook” accounts “Cyberkid” and “CyberAlert”, “Instagram” account 
“@cyberalert.gr”, “Twitter” account “@CyberAlertGR” and the “YouTube” channel 
“Cyber Alert”. 
4.1 Structure of the Hellenic CCD – Roles and re-
sponsibilities of the Departments 
As it has been already mentioned, the Hellenic Cyber Crime Division is based in Attica 
Greece, its local jurisdiction extends throughout the Hellenic territory and it is structured 
into the following Departments: 
1. Department of Administrative Support and Information Management, 
2. Department of Innovative Actions and Strategy, 
3. Department of Electronic and Telephone Communications Security and Soft-
ware and Copyright Protection, 
4. Department of Internet Protection of Minors, 
5. Department of Investigation of Financial Crimes, and 
6. Department of Special Affairs and Digital Investigation. 
Every Department has its own responsibilities and deals with specific types of criminal 
activities and investigations. In detail: 
1. The responsibilities of the Department of Administrative Support and Infor-
mation Management are the following: 
1.1. the handling of personnel issues, the management of financial issues and 
material, the secretarial, administrative and technical support and in gen-
eral, the service of the operational needs of the Police Agency, 
1.2. the collection, study, analysis, evaluation, correlation and processing of 
information, as well as any other data related to the mission of the Police 
Agency, and the transmission of the processed data to the competent De-
partments of the Division for operational use, 
1.3. the care for the continuously specialized training of the staff of the Divi-
sion in matters of investigating cybercrime, through the preparation and 
implementation of educational programs, according to the relevant needs 
of the operational Departments and in collaboration with the Division of 
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Training and Development of Human Resources, along with all other com-
petent authorities of the country and of other nations, through the Division 
of International Police Cooperation of the Hellenic Police Headquarters, 
1.4. the investigation of cases of suicide or disappearance, announced through 
the Internet, 
1.5. providing assistance to the competent government agencies, to prevent su-
icides announced through the Internet. 
To fulfill its mission, the Department of Administrative Support and Information 
Management, cooperates with the Division of Management and Analysis of In-
formation, as defined in the provisions of the Article 22 of Law 4249/2014, to 
which it sends information collected by the Departments of the Division.  
The Department of Administrative Support and Information Management serves 
as a contact point to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest 
Convention) and Directive 2013/40 / EU, on matters of attacks against infor-
mation systems (Article 6 of Law 4411/2016). 
2. The responsibilities of the Department of Innovative Actions and Strategy are 
the following: 
2.1. the actualization of informative presentations for citizens and organiza-
tions on Internet and cybercrime issues, through the implementation of 
various actions, such as conferences, workshops and teleconferences, as 
well as the organization of other innovative actions in the field of combat-
ing cybercrime, 
2.2. the development of strategic plans related to investigating cybercrime, 
2.3. the promotion and publication of the social work of the Agency through 
the creation and management of profiles on social networking sites (“Twit-
ter”, “Facebook”, etc.), exclusively for the purposes of communication, 
information and awareness of the citizens on issues related to the various 
threats and risks of cyberspace, 
2.4. monitoring of all developments in cybercrime, both domestically and in-
ternationally, and preparing a relevant annual report with conclusions re-
garding these criminal activities committed in the country’s territory, and 
submitting specific proposals to address the criminal issues, and 
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2.5. the recording and observance of criminal actions and the preparation of a 
statistics report related to cybercrime. 
3. The Department of Security of Electronic and Telephone Communications and 
Software and Copyright Protection operates in accordance with the provisions 
of the Law 7001/2/1261-(21), common Ministerial decision. Additionally, this 
Department is responsible for: 
3.1. handling criminal cases related to illegal penetration in computer systems 
and theft, destruction/alteration or illegal circulation of software, digital 
data and audiovisual works that take place throughout the country, 
3.2. aiding other competent authorities that investigate these types of criminal 
cases, in accordance with the applicable law, and 
3.3.  the provision of the necessary technical assistance to the other Depart-
ments of the Agency, the conduct of digital and Internet research using 
modern technological equipment and the digital and Internet analysis of 
digital data, files and other media and findings, in cases of investigation of 
serious cases within their authority. 
4. The duties of the Department of Internet Protection of Minors are the following: 
4.1. the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against minors us-
ing the Internet and other means of electronic or digital communication 
and storage, 
4.2. investigating cases of cyber bullying of minors, and 
4.3. to provide assistance to the competent state’s authorities in investigating 
cases related to crimes described in subsections “4.1” and “4.2”, for which 
specialized technical or digital investigation is required. 
5. The responsibilities of the Department of Investigation of Financial Crimes, are 
as follows: 
5.1. the investigation and prosecution, in cooperation with the Financial Police 
Division and the other competent national, European and foreign authori-
ties, that investigate financial crimes and in particular cybercrimes which 
are either committed by using electronic means and new technologies, 
against the financial interests of the public and of the national economy in 
general, or possess the traits of organized financial crime and their inves-
tigation requires specific technical knowledge or experience, 
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5.2. the investigation of financial cybercrime, in cases where specialized tech-
nical or digital investigation is required, 
5.3. providing assistance to government agencies in investigating cases involv-
ing virtual/digital currencies, 
5.4. to provide assistance to the competent state’s authorities, investigating 
cases related to crimes described in subsections “5.1” and “5.2”, for which 
specialized technical or digital investigation is required. 
6. The tasks of the Department of Special Investigations and Digital Investigation, 
are the following: 
6.1. the handling of severe and organized crime cases, as well as all traditional 
crimes committed through the use of the Internet, the investigation of 
which can only be carried out through specialized technical or digital in-
vestigation, and is considered extremely difficult with the utilization of 
any other common police practices, 
6.2. the inspection and investigation of the Internet and of any other means of 
electronic communication and digital storage, for the detection, tracing and 
prosecution of criminal actors, throughout the country, 
6.3. to provide assistance to the competent state’s authorities, which investigate 
cases mentioned in subsections “6.1” and “6.2”, for which specialized 
technical or digital investigation is required. 
For the fulfillment of its mission, the Hellenic Cyber Crime Division cooperates with all 
competent regional authorities of the Hellenic Police and in particular with the Division 
of Informatics, the Division of Management and Information Analysis, the Division of 
Economic Police and the Security Divisions of Attica and Thessaloniki. Moreover, in this 
context, the CCD cooperates with other competent authorities of the country, as well as 
with corresponding authorities and organizations of the EU and other foreign countries, 
in accordance with the applicable provisions and the relevant international agreements 
and conventions. 
The CCD implements and utilizes all the necessary modern technical means and special-
ized equipment. The police staff is specifically trained to apply the utilized methods tools, 




4.2 Interviews from police agents 
From the author’s point of view, it is critical to comprehend both the challenges faced by 
a LEA, specialized in cybercrime investigation, as well as how the entire theoretical anal-
ysis of cybercrime investigations is applied in practice. Therefore, the author has re-
quested and granted the permission to interview high-ranking officers of the Hellenic 
Cyber Crime Subdivision of Northern Greece. For reasons of protection of personal data, 
no information that may possibly identify the interviewed police agents is included. In 
summary, the questions asked to the police agents of the CCU are related to a brief anal-
ysis of the investigated cybercrimes, the levels of cooperation between the Hellenic LEA 
and the various SMPs, as well as the international cooperation among all police agencies, 
worldwide. At the same time, the police officers were asked about their personal opinions 
on the subject of the responses they receive from various SMPs, both via legal processes 
and through the communication platforms, that each SMP has implemented. Finally, the 
interviewed police agents were invited to suggest certain proposals, that would improve 
the level of cooperation, between LEAs and SMPs.  
 
4.2.1 Interview #1 
 
Question: What is your police status and what is the subject of the Division you are the 
head of? Which are the relative criminal offences under investigation? 
Answer: I am a Police Director and I am the head of the Cyber Crime Subdivision of 
Northern Greece. Our police Agency investigates all kinds of cyber related criminal ac-
tivities, such as online frauds, personal data breaches, child sexual abuse/exploitation, 
attacks on critical infrastructures and hacking. Apart from criminal investigation, our 
Agency interacts with the public in order to inform them regarding any imminent cyber 
threats and to receive complaints involving online criminal offences. 
Question: How and to what extent has cybercrime evolved in the past years? 
Answer: Unfortunately, cybercrime has evolved dramatically in the last few years.  
Worldwide, all police agencies and other investigating organizations have reported nu-
merous criminal activities related to cybercrime. The problem is that as the usage of the 
Internet, and especially social media, rises, more criminals tend to be active in cyber-
space. The annual reports issued by both FBI and EUROPOL, which analyze all kinds of 
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cybercrime, are very helpful in order to understand the increase of cybernetic criminal 
activity. The most worrying fact, is the increase of crimes related to child sexual abuse/ex-
ploitation, but also the increased tendency on personal data violations. 
Question: In your opinion, is the cooperation with the foreign companies to which Social 
Media Platforms belong to, deemed necessary? If so, how can this cooperation assist in 
eradicating cybercrime? 
Answer: Cooperation with foreign companies that own social media, can offer many 
advantages in the investigation processes of online criminality. In addition to cybercrime, 
foreign companies can also support the prosecution of the so-called traditional criminal 
activities. Of course, this cooperation must be based on the goodwill of both parties, in 
the fight against crime. The most important issue related to this collaboration is the fact 
that most social media establishments are based in the U.S.A. and therefore, the interac-
tion with them becomes quite difficult. In any case, if this cooperation succeeds, it can 
eradicate crime in a great extent, as almost all criminals are active in some way on the 
Internet, either by attracting victims though it or by using it for personal use. 
Question: Does cooperation between your Division and the various foreign companies, 
that Social Media Platforms belong to, actually exist? If so, which are these foreign com-
panies and what kind of data do you usually enquire for? 
Answer: Fortunately, most social media companies worldwide collaborate with all po-
lice agencies. Social media have either created personal platforms to disclose the re-
quested data or provide information through international law enforcement authorities 
(e.g., EUROPOL). Usually, the companies we work with are “Facebook” / “Instagram”, 
“Twitter”, “Whatsupp” and “Google”, which also have their own communication plat-
forms. Of course, there are other companies, such as “PlanetRomeo” and “TikTok”, 
which provide data through international police cooperation. The most commonly re-
quested data are the electronic traces (IP addresses) of users and the data provided by 
the users during the creation of their account. In cases where we are searching for the 
current location of a missing person, we request for information regarding his/her geo-
location activity. 
Question: Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation that these foreign companies 
provide? In your opinion, is there any way that this cooperation can change in order to 
facilitate an investigation’s methods and practices? 
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Answer: Certainly, the cooperation between our police Agency and the foreign compa-
nies that control social media is quite satisfactory. The only issue that arises is the time-
consuming processes for providing the requested data, which in combination with the 
national legislation, may lead to the non-use of the disclosed electronic traces. Therefore, 
the faster satisfaction of our requests, is an issue that must be resolved immediately. 
Question: Do you believe that the mechanisms of international cooperation among coun-
tries have contributed to the cooperation of foreign Social Media Platforms? 
Answer: International cooperation mechanisms have been very helpful, especially in 
cases where the companies to which social media are owned by, have not yet implemented 
platforms for direct communication with the police authorities. Social Media Platforms 
that are based abroad and do not have such mechanisms, provide the requested data only 
through the channels of police cooperation between countries. At the same time, in addi-
tion to the EUROPOL and INTERPOL channels, there are several countries that have 
incorporated the so-called European Investigation Order, in which any European coun-
try can request information from foreign companies through the relevant Justice depart-
ments. 
 
4.2.2 Interview #2 
 
Question: What is your police status and what is the subject of the Department you are 
the head of? Which are the relative criminal offences under investigation? 
Answer: I am a high-ranking officer of the Hellenic Police and I am the head of the 
Department of Security of Electronic & Telephone Communications and Protection of 
Software & Copyright of the Cybercrime Prosecution Subdivision of Northern Greece. 
The subject of the Department I am in charge of is related to the investigation of criminal 
offenses related to cases of illegal intrusion into computer-information systems, violation 
of the confidentiality of electronic communications, and theft, destruction or illegal cir-
culation of software, hardware, digital data and audiovisual means. The criminal offenses 
that are basically related to these criminal cases are the crimes against telecommunica-
tions of the Penal Code (Articles: 292A “Crimes against the security of telephone com-
munications”, 292B “Obstruction of the operation of information systems”, 292C, 292D 
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“Abuses of the public telecommunications “ and 292E “Obstruction of telecommunica-
tions”), the crimes of violation of individual privacy and communication of the Penal 
Code (Articles: 370B “Illegal access to information system or data”, 370C, 370D and 
370E), and the crimes described by the provisions of Law 2121/1993 “on Intellectual 
Property” and P.D. 343/2002 “on the protection of subscription services”, without, ex-
cluding any confluence with other criminal offenses. Finally, the investigation of these 
criminal offenses is carried out through the collection of evidence and data from the In-
ternet and digital investigation, and their analysis, with the ultimate goal of discovering 
and finally identifying the initially unknown or suspected perpetrators. 
Question: How and to what extent has cybercrime evolved in the past years? 
Answer: Cybercrime is the crime of the modern Information Age. As information, either 
in the form of processed data (software, audiovisual works, etc.) or organized data (da-
tabases, etc.), is stored in digital systems and they are interconnected on a large scale 
through networks and the Internet, genuine cybercrime thrives, as Information itself tends 
to be the object of crime. In addition, the high interconnection of information systems 
creates new fields of action for criminals who use new technologies and the Internet to 
commit traditional crimes (non-genuine cybercrime), in which the object of the crime is 
not the Information itself, but anything else apart from it. It is obvious, that every aspect 
of modern life includes new technologies, e.g. the Internet and information systems, and 
consequently cybercrime becomes an integral part of it with ever-increasing tendencies, 
to the extent that technology itself is also a part of it.  
Question: In your opinion, is the cooperation with the foreign companies to which Social 
Media Platforms belong to, deemed necessary? If so, how can this cooperation assist in 
eradicating cybercrime? 
Answer: Social networks could be described as the “new order of things” in our modern 
lives. Through them, the communication of hundreds of millions of people around the 
world is achieved, transactions are promoted in every possible way, a huge amount of 
information is exchanged, etc., while the average modern person maintains a digital face 
in a “parallel” virtual world. Consequently, the infringement of a person’s legally pro-
tected rights through social networks disrupts the legal order significantly and to a large 
extent, making the enforcing of penalties on criminal actors, crucial. In this light, coop-
eration with the companies that manage social networks is deemed necessary in order to 
enable the detection and prosecution of perpetrators of heinous acts committed by them, 
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by maintaining and providing to the Law Enforcement Authorities the information that 
will lead to their identification, but also preventively by adopting practices and methods 
that will exclude the “activities” of the offenders on a case-by-case basis. If these collab-
orations generate the desired results, then they will be utilized as a preventative method 
for any ambitious perpetrators. 
Question: Does cooperation between your Department and the various foreign compa-
nies, that Social Media Platforms belong to, actually exist? If so, which are these foreign 
companies and what kind of data do you usually enquire for? 
Answer: Several foreign social media companies have developed specialized communi-
cation techniques, through which Law Enforcement Authorities can interact with them, 
in order to “fight” cybercrime. However, many of them require highly time-consuming 
legal procedures to provide the data, resulting in the loss of information that would be 
used for the investigation of crimes (e.g., mutual legal assistance treaty). On the other 
hand, there are companies that provide the requested information directly to our Agency, 
for legal use in court proceedings. Such companies are mainly “Facebook”, “Insta-
gram”, “Google” (for “YouTube”), etc., while the requested data mostly concern Inter-
net connection logs, i.e. IP addresses with their respective timestamps, as well as any 
other available identification and communication information of the user, such as regis-
tered identification details, telephone, email, payment information, and any other infor-
mation stored by each company that can be used to continue the investigation, until the 
perpetrator of the crime is detected and identified. 
Question: Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation that these foreign companies 
provide? In your opinion, is there any way that this cooperation can change in order to 
facilitate an investigation’s methods and practices? 
Answer: The level of cooperation will always have room for improvement. Of course, the 
foreign companies with which we cooperate, already provide enough information for the 
further investigation of cybercrime criminal cases. Usually, the obstacles in providing 
the requested information are of legal nature, according to the law that applies in each 
company. In particular, although foreign companies retain information useful and usable 
for the detection of perpetrators, they may not provide them to us, depending on the 
threatened legally protected right, such as the foreign companies “Facebook” and 
“Google” do not provide data in cases where the legally protected right, is the freedom 
of speech. From a technical point of view, improvement can be achieved by mandatory 
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application of procedures for verifying the data provided by users, such as email ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, etc., so that the data recorded is as consistent, valid and 
accurate as possible, so they can be used as solid evidence to identify the perpetrators on 
a case-by-case basis. In addition, a significant improvement could be made in the time 
requirement for the provision of the requested data, i.e. “the faster, the better”. 
Question: Do you believe that the mechanisms of international cooperation among coun-
tries have contributed to the cooperation of foreign Social Media Platforms? 
Answer: Judging by the procedures used to exchange information through international 
co-operation between countries (either police co-operation or judicial co-operation), the 
flow of information that can be used is in most cases hindered by legal issues, such as 
prohibitions on using this information for prosecution of the perpetrators, provided 
through international police cooperation, or by the time-consuming bureaucratic pro-
cesses required in order to finally provide the information that will contribute to the in-
vestigation. In any case, the main issue is the time that elapses from the time of the request 
to the disclosure of the requested data, a fact that threatens the usability of the data pro-
vided in the end. Therefore, although international cooperation contributes to the detec-
tion of cybercrime, the issue that arises each time is of “time nature”, regarding the uti-
lization of the available data, thus mechanisms with faster response times would signifi-
cantly improve the effectiveness of Law Enforcement Authorities. Comparing some of the 
mechanisms of international cooperation among countries, we can conclude that, for 
now, the process of the European Investigation Order is considered the most effective 
(with the limitation that this procedure includes cooperation only within the European 
Union), while in any case the direct communication and provision of data from the for-
eign companies on a case-by-case basis without the intervention of the state’s mecha-
nisms, excels, purely due to the directness of the communication and the relatively short 
time required for the provision of the requested data. 
 
 
4.2.3 Interview #3 
 
Question: What is your police status and what is the subject of the Department you are 
the head of? Which are the relative criminal offences under investigation? 
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Answer: I am a police lieutenant colonel and I currently serve as the head of the Depart-
ment of Investigation of Financial Crimes. As the name of the department implies, the 
main responsibility of the department I supervise is the prosecution of economic crimes 
committed through the Internet, and online fraud is the one that we mostly meet nowa-
days. 
Question: How and to what extent has cybercrime evolved in the past years? 
Answer: It is a matter of fact that online crimes evolve day by day. During the last few 
years, we have often witnessed a rapid shift to the types of online criminality. For in-
stance, if you recall the threat reports ENISA has produced since 2013, you will notice 
that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) the offenders use have changed scien-
tifically. For example, despite malware remains a top threat for information systems, the 
evolution and proliferation of Internet enabled devices, have changed the way attackers 
act, meaning that they usually tend to attack less secure devices. Last but not least, the 
emergence of ransomware has significantly changed the information security landscape. 
Question: In your opinion, is the cooperation with the foreign companies to which Social 
Media Platforms belong to, deemed necessary? If so, how can this cooperation assist in 
eradicating cybercrime? 
Answer: In my point of view, close cooperation between law enforcement and industry 
is the key to minimize online criminality. Consider that private companies possess the 
information needed for law enforcement to act effectively. Law Enforcement Authorities 
across the globe require private sector to disclose information for investigation purposes. 
On top of that, consider that private industry including Social Media Platforms are re-
sponsible for applying security measures to harden their systems. Of course, cooperation 
with Law Enforcement Authorities could also benefit private sector in terms of applying 
best practices. 
Question: Does cooperation between your Department and the various foreign compa-
nies, that Social Media Platforms belong to, actually exist? If so, which are these foreign 
companies and what kind of data do you usually enquire for?  
Answer: Many private companies worldwide have acknowledged the benefits of close 
cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities. So, they usually provide relevant infor-
mation to my Agency when certain legal requirements are met. For example, “Face-
book”, “Google” and some other well-known companies usually provide information 
such as subscribers’ registration details and connection history on a voluntary basis. Of 
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course, there are companies that cannot provide direct information to foreign authorities 
due to restrictive legal frameworks in the countries they reside. In such cases, the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties can be applied and local Law Enforcement Authorities can 
obtain the required information from those companies. 
Question: Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation that these foreign companies 
provide? In your opinion, is there any way that this cooperation can change in order to 
facilitate an investigation’s methods and practices? 
Answer: As stated above, some private sector companies provide information to my 
Agency on a voluntary basis. Even in these cases there is always room for improvement. 
To be more precise, it would be particularly important if we could minimize the timeframe 
between the inquiry and the provision of information. 
Question: Do you believe that the mechanisms of international cooperation among coun-
tries have contributed to the cooperation of foreign Social Media Platforms? 
Answer: I believe these mechanisms constantly mature. From the early stages of inter-
national cooperation, where the exchange of information was a complex procedure to the 
provision of information on a voluntary basis, that many companies support, a great im-
provement has been made. At this point I want to highlight the role that EUROPOL and 
INTERPOL have played to achieve such a success. Representatives of these organizations 
are in close cooperation with private sector, trying to improve the levels of international 
cybercrime investigation and, of course, tackle the illegal activities of organized crime 
groups acting on the Internet. 
 
4.2.4 Interview #4 
 
Question: What is your police status and what is the subject of the Department you are 
the head of? Which are the relative criminal offences under investigation? 
Answer: I am a Police Major, and I have been the head of the Department of Internet 
Protection of Minors and Digital Investigation, of the Cyber Crime Subdivision of North-
ern Greece since 2015. The territorial jurisdiction of our Division extends to Northern 
Greece, Thrace and the Northern Aegean islands, whilst the responsibilities of the De-
partment of Internet Protection of Minors and Digital Investigation, are the following: 
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i. the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against minors us-
ing the Internet and other means of electronic or digital communication 
and storage, 
ii. investigating cases of cyber bullying and racism or xenophobic content 
on the Internet, as well as cases involving suicide and cases of suicide or 
disappearance via the Internet, 
iii. providing assistance to the competent state’s authorities for the preven-
tion of suicides announced via the Internet, as well as to the authorities 
investigating cases of crimes committed on the Internet in accordance 
with the applicable law. 
In practice, the most serious cases, and the main object of the Department's staff, is the 
criminal investigation of offenses against sexual freedom, committed online against mi-
nors, such as violations of Articles 337 "Insult of sexual dignity," 348Α "Child sexual 
abuse/exploitation", 348B "Attracting children for sexual reasons" and 348C "Porno-
graphic performances of minors ", of the Hellenic Penal Code. 
Question: How and to what extent has cybercrime evolved in the past years? 
Answer: It is common knowledge that the use of the Internet, has not only increased 
dramatically in the past few years, but it is now an integral part of our lives, to the point 
that our life is considered unimaginable without its daily use. From transactions to en-
tertainment and human interactions, the Internet is more or less used everywhere. In the 
age of globalization, the Internet is said to have provided an easy and cost-effective so-
lution to issues related to communication, created by the ever-increasing physical dis-
tance. Today, the communication between two entities in opposite parts of the world not 
only does not seem impossible, but with the use of the Internet can be achieved without 
much cost and resources. 
During the last year that the whole planet is plagued by the covid-19 virus and the dis-
tance in communications has become an inviolable rule for health reasons, Internet com-
munication has replaced even the most traditional forms of live communication, such as 
education. The explosive increase in the use of the Internet for everyday purposes, has 
resulted in the rapid increase in the use of the Internet for illegal activities. The benefits 
and anonymity of the Internet are being exploited, not only by law-abiding citizens, but 
also by those who wish to commit a crime, as the physical distance from the victim gives 
them the feeling that they will not be located in order to face the consequences of the law. 
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As a result, it is more preferable from criminals to commit crimes online, rather than 
naturally, as in the past. Consequently, computer frauds, hacking of subscription services, 
sexual harassment and attraction of minors, circulation of child sexual abuse/exploita-
tion, etc., are crimes that are committed mainly through the Internet. 
Question: In your opinion, is the cooperation with the foreign companies to which Social 
Media Platforms belong to, deemed necessary? If so, how can this cooperation assist in 
eradicating cybercrime? 
Answer: As mentioned above, the combination of technology and Internet use has elimi-
nated the physical distances in communication. Thus, we can easily communicate with a 
friend who is a few meters away, using a social networking application provided by a 
company based in the United States of America and using servers in Ireland. However, 
the phenomenon of communications’ globalization creates many complex problems for 
Law Enforcement Authorities, in cases of criminal investigation of crimes committed 
through the Internet.  
Solving the problems that sometimes arise seems impossible, as the initiation and com-
pletion of the existing legal procedures (e.g. mutual legal assistance treaty) to obtain the 
required data from foreign companies requires a sufficient period of time, while this data 
is stored by national ISPs for a limited period of time, depending in each case on the 
applicable national law. For this reason, there is an urgent need for direct and close 
cooperation with foreign private companies that provide various Internet communication 
applications, in order to achieve a rapid criminal investigation of cybercrimes. 
Question: Does cooperation between your Department and the various foreign compa-
nies, that Social Media Platforms belong to, actually exist? If so, which are these foreign 
companies and what kind of data do you usually enquire for? 
Answer: Our Agency, like any other Law Enforcement Agency worldwide, has imple-
mented direct communication channels with the major foreign companies that provide 
various online communication applications, such as “Facebook”, “Google”, “Twitter”, 
“Microsoft”, “Kik Interactive”, etc. Thus, during the investigation of serious criminal 
cases, our Agency submits direct requests for the provision of the required data, which 
are usually electronic traces (log data) and all available registration and payment details 
(registration / payment details), accompanied with a relevant Prosecutor's/ Judicial Or-
der. Then, the companies examine the submitted requests and if the legal conditions are 
met, they provide the requested data, directly to our Agency, in a relatively short period 
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of time. In this way they provide immediate and substantial assistance in the prosecution 
of cybercrime, which in any other case, would have been extremely difficult. 
Question: Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation that these foreign companies 
provide? In your opinion, is there any way that this cooperation can change in order to 
facilitate an investigation ’s methods and practices? 
Answer: The direct cooperation of our Agency with the companies that provide the var-
ious Internet communication applications, has numerous benefits on the investigation of 
crimes, and is considered as a valuable tool in the pre-investigation process. There is 
certainly room for improvement, such as the increase of the categories of data that these 
companies can provide or the reduction in response times. However, although there is a 
mutual determination to improve the already existing cooperation, the current legislation 
is often an obstacle for its improvement. For example, due to the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), it is not possible for Social Media Platforms to provide specific in-
formation, such as the content of a user’s communication. Also, due to the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom of speech in the U.S.A., it is not possible for Social Media Platforms 
to provide data related to criminal activities regarding slanderous comments, posted pub-
licly by users. 
Question: Do you believe that the mechanisms of international cooperation among coun-
tries have contributed to the cooperation of foreign Social Media Platforms? 
Answer: In addition to the channels of direct communication with foreign companies, 
provided by the above-mentioned procedure, in the field of combating sexual abuse and 
exploitation of minors in general, which is the main object of my Department, there is 
another level of international cooperation, which is worth mentioning. 
Based in the U.S.A., the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) 
exists and operates, while the National Child Exploitation Coordination Center (NCECC) 
exists and operates in Canada. These organizations cooperate with various other organ-
izations and national ISPs, in a joint effort to combat the phenomenon of the reproduction 
of child sexual abuse/exploitation and its circulation, through the Internet. When the 
aforementioned companies or organizations discover that child sexual abuse/exploitation 
material is being circulated through their information systems, they shall inform the com-
petent authority, providing it with additional information about the users involved in this 
criminal activity. The latter forwards the provided information to the competent Law En-
forcement Authorities. In case that the aforementioned criminal activity is detected by 
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users within the Hellenic territory, a large amount of valuable information provided on 
a voluntary basis by the organizations and private social media companies, end up 
through the channels of international police cooperation (EUROPOL- INTERPOL), in 
our Agency, in order to assist the investigation of sexual exploitation of minors. A thor-
ough investigation follows, which results in the identification of criminals and their ar-
rest, a fact that without the above-mentioned procedure would have been completely im-
possible. 
 
In conclusion, as the high-ranking officers have stated in their interviews, cybercrime is 
evolving constantly. Although the enjoyment of SMPs’ services is considered to be a 
necessity in our society, cybercriminals tend to exploit the provided benefits, in order to 
gain unlawful profit. Police agents, applying all sorts of traditional policing methodolo-
gies and technical practices, are trying their best to eradicate cybercrime. The cooperation 
amongst SMPs and all LEAs worldwide, has in a great extent supported this purpose. 
Additionally, the international cooperation amongst all LEAs is considered to be of out-
most necessity, due to the physical and legal boundaries excluding non-U.S.A. police 
agencies from the immediate provision of the requested data. All in all, the police agents 
have clearly described that the biggest issue that rises from the existing cooperating pro-
cedures is the time-consuming processes regarding the disclosure of a user’s data, which, 
combined with the long lasting legal and bureaucratic proceedings, may result in the ex-
tinction of the unknown criminals’ trails. In the future, these problems ought to be re-
solved, as they detain the identification of the unidentified perpetrators and the elimina-
tion of online criminal activities, in general.  
4.3 Real time scenarios 
4.3.1 Intention to commit suicide 
One of the most challenging types of investigations handled by a cybercrime agent are 
the incidents where users express their intention to commit suicide. In these cases, users 
usually upload a post on their personal account or communicate with others and confess 
their dark thoughts. The challenging part of this type of investigation is the identification 
of the unknown user in a limited amount of time. On most occasions, the investigations 
involving the identification and localization of the user in question are carried out by 
experienced police agents, who seek for details that will prevent the occurrence of the 
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suicide. LEAs communicate with the SMP that the investigated person used to confine 
his/her intentions and request for the disclosure of the data that will immediately eliminate 
the possible threat and, eventually, save a person’s life. In this scenario, we will examine 
a case where a person directly contacted a virtual friend, using a SNS, and expressed 
his/her intention to commit suicide. 
The CCU received an anonymous tip by a civilian, via its call complaint center, informing 
the Agency that an unknown user of a SNS had sent a direct message to another user of 
the platform, through which s/he had confessed his/her intention to commit suicide. The 
police officer who received the tip, requested the civilian who informed the Agency to 
provide further information regarding the incident, such as a screenshot of the user’s ac-
count and the exchanged messages, through which the unknown user voiced his/her sui-
cidal intentions. The unknown informant sent the requested data to an experienced police 
agent, who then proceeded on evaluating the case. 
After the assessment of the situation and its characterization as an “emergency”, the po-
lice agent who handled the case proceeded on sending an “emergency data request” to the 
SNS that the investigated person employed, in order to communicate with his/her virtual 
friend. Through the request, the law enforcer asked for the disclosure of data related to 
the user’s recent log data (IP addresses and timestamps), the information that the user in 
question provided to the SNS at the time of his/her registration and, most importantly, the 
current geolocation activity. Through its automated processes, the SNS enquired about 
the reasons that characterized the case as an “emergency” and solicited for detailed proof, 
in order to disclose the user’s data without the former provision of a signed legal proceed-
ing. Without losing any time, the police officer responded with a brief explanation of the 
case, supplemented with attached screenshots of the messages. The SNS immediately 
provided the requested information to the LEA, apart from the geolocation data, as the 
investigated user had disabled the location feature of the SNS.  
Once the handler of the case received the information s/he needed in order to identify the 
unknown user and locate his/her current whereabouts, s/he then proceeded on examining 
the data provided by the SNS. The first step was to analyze the log data, in order to match 
the provided IP addresses with their corresponding ISPs. Then, s/he proceeded on exam-
ining the registration data of the user, seeking for information that would probably iden-
tify him/her. As the latter method did not pay off, the police agent focused on the only 
traces s/he had; the log data of the investigated person. 
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Afterwards, the law enforcer contacted the corresponding ISPs, which resulted from the 
analysis of the log data (two different national ISPs) and requested for the disclosure of 
the identification information of their subscribers, to whom the IP addresses were as-
signed to. According to the first ISP’s response, the requested IP addresses where public 
(i.e., NAT IP addresses) and were not assigned to any subscriber. The second ISP matched 
the requested IP addresses to a single subscriber and provided his/her identification de-
tails. 
Thus, the investigation so far resulted in the disclosure of one (1) subscriber’s identifica-
tion details. After further examination of the subscriber’s provided identification details 
and research through the LEA’s databases, the police agent came up with a discovery. 
The subscriber had an adolescent child, whose photographs and identification details re-
sembled those of the user who sent the suicidal messages. The police agent immediately 
contacted the local police department’s officers, who in turn sent a police crew to the 
identified subscriber’s residence, in order to determine if the adolescent was indeed the 
user who sent the messages and, in a positive case, to ensure his/her physical and mental 
integrity. The dispatched police officers located the citizen, verified that s/he was the 
actual user who expressed his/her intention to commit suicide, ensured his/her physical 
integrity and escorted him/her to the local police department. During the citizen’s deten-
tion at the department, s/he was interviewed by a specialized phycologist in order to as-
sess his/her mental integrity and determine how to further handle the situation. All in all, 
the investigation resulted in the identification of the unknown user and, at the end of the 
day, saved his/her life. 
At this point, it must be clarified that under the applicable law, both the disclosure of a 
user’s data from a SMP and the provision of a subscriber’s identification information, 
require a former issue of a signed legal proceeding. In cases of imminent threats of life, 
due to the severeness of the situations, the police agents acquire for the immediate provi-
sion of the aforementioned data without a prior issue of such a proceeding, from both 
SMPs and national ISP, as they can be long lasting procedures, which may hold back the 
investigation and possibly result in the occurrence of the incident. In any case, after solv-
ing the case and rescuing the endangered citizen, the investigator who handled the case is 
obliged to inform the national legal authorities (e.g., district attorney, public prosecutor) 
in order to obtain the signed legal proceeding and then submit it to all the parties which 
provided the crucial information (i.e., SMPs and national ISPs.). 
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4.3.2 Personal Data – Identity Theft – Provoking minor to incest  
Due to the implementation of the GDPR, identity theft and infringement of personal data 
are violations that are considered to be extremely severe and are being prosecuted accord-
ingly. As most people have a registered account on numerous SNSs, the extraction of a 
user’s personal data and his/her identify theft are considered to be a fairly easy process. 
It does not require any special skills or technical knowledge. Usually, these violations are 
committed with the purpose of executing other criminal acts. Perpetrators may “steal” 
any type of a user’s personal data, in order to commit frauds, execute social engineering 
attacks or perform child exploitation activities. In order to emphasize the danger behind 
the commitment of such a criminal act, we will analyze a scenario, where the perpetrator 
“stole” a minor’s identification details and photographs and used them to provoke another 
minor to incest.  
An unknown criminal actor “stole” a minor’s personal data (i.e., personal photographs 
name and surname), information that the minor had previously uploaded on his personal 
account on a SNS. Then, the perpetrator proceeded on creating another account, using the 
“stolen” data, on the same SNS. Soon after, s/he searched through the minor’s “Friends” 
list and sent various messages to several of them, pretending to be the real user. One of 
them, also a minor, responded to the messages, as s/he thought s/he was communicating 
with his/her actual friend. The two users, criminal and victim, exchanged more than a few 
messages. The criminal’s purpose was to gain the victim’s trust and exploit him/her. 
Through his/her last message, the criminal actor attempted to provoke the minor to incest, 
by requesting the child to meet him/her and perform several sexual acts. The minor im-
mediately informed his/her parents, who in turn filed a lawsuit against the unknown crim-
inal actor.    
As the case involved the theft of a user’s personal data, it was handed over to the Depart-
ment of Electronic and Telephone Communications Security and Software and Copyright 
Protection. Due to the severity of the criminal activity, it was assigned to an experienced 
police agent, who could handle both interviewing the victims and the investigation of the 
case. At first, the police officer questioned the minors/victims in order to acquire all the 
necessary evidence and proceed with the investigation. The victims provided the details 
of the criminal’s account and screenshots with the exchanged messages. Thereafter, the 
police agent had to come up with a plan to make good use of the existing information.  
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Before heading into the heart of the investigation, the police agent ensured that s/he had 
in his/her possession all the legal paperwork demanded for the disclosure of the criminal’s 
data. Then, s/he contacted the SNS, that the perpetrator exploited in order to communicate 
with the minor and requested for the disclosure of the account’s processed information. 
Anything that the SNS could provide would be vital for the identification of the unknown 
criminal. Thankfully, the SNS provided the log data (IP addresses and timestamps), along 
with the information that the user provided at the time of his/her registration. As it turned 
out, the criminal used the data, “stolen” from the first victim, in order to register in the 
SNS and generate his/her account. Thus, the police agent was obliged to analyze the dis-
closed IP addreses, as they were the only evidence that could possibly result in the per-
petrators identification.  
The investigator analyzed the log data and matched the IP addresses with their corre-
sponding ISPs. Later, s/he contacted the ISPs and requested for the disclosure of the iden-
tification details of their subscribers. Ultimately, the investigation so far provided the 
names of six (6) different people. One of them would probably be the unknown criminal. 
As there was no other specialized investigation that the investigator could conduct to 
identify the perpetrator, s/he proceeded on interrogating the above-mentioned subscrib-
ers. Five (5) of them denied their involvement in the criminal act. However, the last sub-
scriber admitted his/her close relation to the person who committed the investigated crim-
inal activities. The agent demanded the interrogated subscriber to disclose the identity 
information of the suspect and conducted a brief search with the provided information, 
using the LEA’s databases. As it turned out, the suspect had a history of criminal activities 
related to child sexual abuse/exploitation. Finally, a group of highly trained police officers 
searched for the suspect’s current whereabouts and proceeded with his/her arrest and 
criminal prosecution. 
4.3.3 Fraud 
Fraud related cases are the most common criminal activities that occur in cyberspace. 
Crooks attract their victims in various ways, with the ultimate purpose of gaining unlaw-
ful profit. Regularly, they use SNSs in order to either upload the content that will probably 
result in the occurrence of the fraudulent activity or search for people who are considered 
to be too naïve to easily trust them. In this subsection, we will analyze the commitment 
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of an illegal activity, where the criminal uses the SMP to upload his/her deceptive content 
and entice several victims. 
The victim had searched for relevant advertisements on various SNSs, due to his/her in-
terest in buying an agricultural machine (tractor). During his/her search, the user located 
an ad for the sale of a tractor which was posted by another user of the platform, in a 
private group. The victim contacted, via direct messaging, the alleged seller and after they 
agreed on the purchase of the tractor, they continued their communication both through 
the SNS’s messaging feature and through conventional mobile interaction. After the set-
tlement of the financial and shipment details of the transaction, the victim proceeded on 
depositing the money and waited for the delivery of the purchased machine. In the end, 
the victim realized the occurrence of the criminal activity, after the unknown perpetrator 
had received the deposited money, but never responded to his/her texts and phone calls.   
At the time the victim realized that s/he was scammed by an unknown criminal, s/he filed 
a lawsuit against him/her and asked for the assistance of the CCU. The case was handed 
over to the specialized agents of the Department of Investigation of Financial Crimes. At 
first, the police officer assigned with the identification of the unknown perpetrator 
searched for information by utilizing traditional police practices. Specifically, s/he con-
tacted the national telecommunication service provider and acquired for the information 
of the subscriber, who interacted with the victim. Moreover, he contacted the bank, 
through which the money was transferred, in order to acquire the data of the person who 
collected it. In both cases, the investigation did not result in the identification of the crim-
inal. Nevertheless, the agent had another clue that s/he had not investigated up to that 
point. The criminal had a registered account on a SNS. Thus, s/he proceeded on request-
ing the criminal’s account information from the related SNS. 
After the issue of the required legal proceeding, the investigator contacted the SNS via 
its implemented request platform and requested for the disclosure of the information re-
garding the investigated account and shortly after, the SNS provided them. The investi-
gator analyzed the provided log data (IP addresses and timestamps) and matched them 
with their corresponding ISPs. Hereupon, the police agent contacted the national ISPs and 
requested for the disclosure of the identification details of their subscribers. The investi-
gation so far, resulted in the identification of three (3) different subscribers, who would 
possibly have a connection with the unknown perpetrator.  
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The police agent conducted a thorough search on the subscribers’ identities through the 
CCU’s databases and discovered that one of them was related to a prosecuted criminal, 
who committed several online frauds on various websites. The investigator contacted the 
local police department’s officers, who handled that case, and asked for the provision of 
the investigation’s details. The outcome of the local department’s investigation was the 
prosecution of twenty-five (25) people, who formed a criminal organization and commit-
ted various frauds, either conventionally or online. The only evidence that was missing 
from the puzzle, was the correlation between the mastermind and the rest of the crew. As 
it turned out, the mastermind was the criminal who had created the account on the SNS 
and committed the criminal activity, investigated by the CCU. Subsequently, the last 
crook was arrested and prosecuted, along with the other members of the criminal organi-
zation.   
4.3.4 Child sexual abuse/exploitation 
 
Unlike all other relevant cybercrime investigations, the procedure of investigating a case 
involving child sexual abuse/exploitation is considered to be one of the most severe. The 
investigation of this category of criminal activity is usually handed over to high-ranking 
police agents, specialized in the field of combating criminal activities against minors. 
Usually, the high-ranking policemen do no act alone. They form a team of specially 
trained police officers, involving forensics specialists, psychologists and negotiators. 
CCUs investigate child sexual abuse/exploitation related cases that are committed by two 
different ways. The first case is when a user manages to acquire child sexual abuse/ex-
ploitation material from any possible online source, such as the dark web, and then dis-
tributes it to other users with the utilization of SMPs, free of charge or by payment. The 
second case is where a user communicates with a virtual friend, receives the heinous sex-
ual material and then storages it for personal use. In this scenario we will examine the 
first case. 
The Cyber Crime Division received an official report, via the EUROPOL channels, from 
the National Child Exploitation Coordination Center (NCECC) based in Canada, through 
which the organization provided several information involving the distribution and circu-
lation of child sexual abuse/exploitation material. In its report the organization clarified 
that the material was distributed with the exploitation of a SNS. Additionally, the user 
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who sent the material to other “netizens”, was located within the Hellenic territory. Before 
heading in the thorough analysis of the scenario, it is essential to briefly analyze the op-
eration of the NCECC.  
The NCECC is an organization that collaborates with various SMPs and private compa-
nies, that provide any kind of Internet services, which are established in Canada, in a joint 
effort to eradicate the phenomenon of child sexual abuse/exploitation, circulated through 
the Internet. Whenever the aforementioned SMPs or companies realize that child sexual 
abuse/exploitation material is being distributed through their information systems, they 
shall inform the NCECC, providing the organization with additional information about 
the users involved in these criminal activities. The latter, in turn, not having the authority 
to investigate either the users or the criminal activities transmits the information provided 
to it, to the competent Law Enforcement Authorities. 
As described, the NCECC provided the CCU with various information, regarding the log 
data that were assigned to the user who possessed and circulated child sexual abuse/ex-
ploitation material, by exploiting the SMP, along with other details that the above-men-
tioned user provided to the SNS at the time of his/her registration, such as a verified phone 
number, e-mail, username, etc. It is worth mentioning that the SNS, apart from the user’s 
log data, also recorder the type of the device that the criminal actor regularly used, in 
order to access the platform. After the provision of the data, the Hellenic CCU proceeded 
on executing all the required legal proceedings in order to legally prosecute the criminal. 
Along with the execution of the necessary proceedings, the Police Agency analyzed the 
disclosed log data and matched the provided IP addresses with their corresponding ISPs. 
Later, the LEA contacted the corresponding national ISP, in order to identify the unknown 
user. After the provision of the identification details of the subscriber, the CCU handed 
over the investigation of the case to its Subdivision, as the user/criminal was located in 
the latter’s territorial jurisdiction. 
The high-ranking officer of the Department of Internet Protection of Minors, who was 
assigned with the further investigation of the case, put together a group of specialized and 
experienced police officers of the Agency and proceeded with the investigation of the 
criminal. The police officers conducted a thorough search of the person’s criminal history 
and monitored his daily routine. Once they gathered all the necessary information, 
through espionage, the group of agents went to the criminal’s known residence and con-
ducted a lawful investigation at his/her house, in order to verify the existence of any type 
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of physical or digital material, related to child sexual abuse/exploitation. At the time of 
the search, the police agents found and confiscated two (2) computers and one (1) cell 
phone, that belonged to the investigated subscriber. The first hint, that the police agents 
discovered and linked the investigated person with the criminal activity, was the fact that 
the confiscated mobile device, was the same type of device that the unknown perpetrator 
frequently used, in order to access the SMP.  
In an on-site forensic examination of the confiscated computers, the forensic examinators 
did not find any material related to child sexual abuse/exploitation. Instead, by utilizing 
specialized methods and forensic tools, they discovered that the user of the confiscated 
devices, was the owner of the same e-mail account, that both NCECC and the SNS pro-
vided in their initial report, as the registered account of the criminal. Furthermore, the 
agents discovered that the user of the devices had created accounts on various cloud ser-
vices, in order to upload and save his/her personal files online and not on any physical 
devices. Once the police agents gained access into the user’s cloud accounts, they discov-
ered that s/he had indeed uploaded several photos related to child sexual abuse/exploita-
tion. Finally, the police officers wrapped up the investigation, gathered all the necessary 
evidence that verified the possession and distribution of child sexual abuse/exploitation 



















5 Recommendations   
5.1 Implementation of an International Intelligence 
Library 
From what has been stated in the interviews which have been conducted with the high-
ranking officers of the CCSNG, it is concluded that the long-lasting processes of provid-
ing a user’s data can many times ruin the whole investigation. The author will hereby 
present his own proposal, in terms of international cooperation of entities involved in the 
field of tackling cybercrime. In case that these suggestions are applied and utilized 
properly, they may possibly minimize the risk of losing an ongoing investigation’s evi-
dence, along with preventing several types of cybercrime in general. 
A common database, between SMPs and LEAs, should be developed. Through this data-
base, authorized personnel of both entities could upload data of users who have been 
investigated, as well as prosecuted criminals. These data may either derive from the con-
fiscated physical and digital devices of the perpetrators or from the reporting mechanisms 
of the SMPs. This database should be developed and handled by a third-party entity (pri-
vate company or international organization), but in any case, the provision of the intelli-
gence that would form the “International Intelligence Library” should be under the afore-
mentioned entities’ responsibility and meet all necessary EU data protection standards. 
With the implementation of this database, confiscated artifacts and intelligence gathered 
by LEAs would be uploaded, so that SMPs’ either authorized personnel or automated 
processes, would be able to match them with their users’ processed data and alert the 
police agencies, in case that the criminal actors utilized them in order to access the SMPs 
and perform any illegal activity. Likewise, SMPs could upload/import any data collected 
by its reporting mechanisms, so that in case a criminal activity occurred in the entity’s 
virtual environment, the corresponding police authority, would immediately be informed 
in order to take all the appropriate legal actions, according to the criminal’s networking 
data and the recorded geolocation activity.  
To this extend, there are two important parameters which should be met as they are vital 
for the proper handling of the provided information. Initially, SMPs must deploy the 
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proper mechanisms in order to verify a user’s data provided at the time of his/her regis-
tration, which lead to the generation of the uniquely identified profile. Specifically, when-
ever a user registers in any SMP and creates an account, the SMP must verify that at least 
some of the provided information are accurate. This process would not only reduce the 
number of fake accounts on SNSs, but it would also provide at least some reliable piece 
of information; so, the identification of the violator would be much easier in case of the 
infringement of the community’s rules. In any case, the SMPs must not exploit this pro-
cess and request for irrational proportions of verified information. Nevertheless, the rea-
sons behind the establishment of these virtual societies must not be neglected. Common 
people and average users employ SMPs in order to freely express themselves and share 
content. Not all “netizens” are criminals. That is the reason why the verification of a user’s 
data is a process that must be handled with caution and applied for specific categories of 
data, e.g. verified phone number, registered address or at least one verified user’s photo-
graph.  
On the other hand, LEAs which conduct criminal investigations and home searches in 
order to verify the commitment of a cybercrime, in general, and identify the unknown 
perpetrators, should perform specialized practices in order to preserve the confiscated 
artifacts. In detail, as it has been analyzed through the real time scenarios, whenever 
CCU’s agents handle a case which results in the identification and prosecution of the 
criminal actor, the artifacts utilized by the perpetrator during his/her execution of the 
criminal activity -either physical or digital means- are confiscated. Serial numbers of 
physical devices (e.g., laptops, mobile phones), accounts (e.g., e-mails, uniquely identi-
fied profiles on SNSs) and networking data (e.g., static IP addresses, MAC addresses, 
etc.) are the artifacts that are usually examined by LEAs and, therefore, used as evidence 
in the legal processes. Before the use of the impounded artifacts as evidence, specialized 
forensics experts should conduct a forensic examination on them and generate their “hash 
values” (see above, p. 22).  
The “hash values” ensure the data’s integrity. Subsequently, these “hash values” would 
be provided by the corresponding LEAs and uploaded on the “international library”, as 
intelligence for any future use. To this extend, whenever an official criminal investigator 
or a SMP’s authorized personnel uploaded any type of data to the intelligence library, 
they could easily be queried through the database and if the “hash values” matched with 
the provided information of any related criminal activity or corresponding criminal actor, 
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then the investigators would have extra evidence either for the further investigation of the 
case or for the prosecution of the criminal actor.  
Conclusively, this common database would create an international investigation platform, 
where both LEAs and SMPs could either provide or inquire any requested data and handle 
cases, in which either the unknown perpetrator or the investigated criminal activity went 
beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Time consuming proceedings would be eliminated, 
as already investigated cybercrimes’ or identified criminals’ information would be both 
uploaded in the database and available for any future use, for investigation and intelli-
gence purposes.  
5.2 The future of the Hellenic Cyber Crime Division       
Apart from the recommended implementation of an “International Intelligence Library”, 
the author will also present several proposals that match the CCD’s vision and in case 
they are adopted, they may possibly ameliorate the future of the Agency. 
Initially, the Agency should aim at establishing local cybercrime departments in every 
Local Police Division, which will be staffed either by local police officers, who are fa-
miliar with the community’s needs and customs but need further training in the field of 
combating cybercrime or they will be recruited directly from the Police Academy with 
officers who possess the desired specialized knowledge and skills. 
Furthermore, the LEA should furtherly cooperate with other regional state’s authorities 
and assist them in cybercrime cases. Specifically, the LEA should seek in informing all 
public servants regarding the proper procedure of securing digital evidence, in cases of 
attacks on the critical infrastructures of the competent public authority in order to facili-
tate the further investigation of the cases. To this extend, the CCD should expand the 
already existing cooperation with other competent specialized authorities of the Hellenic 
Police for the dismantling of criminal organizations, which operate through the Internet. 
In order to intensify its actions and preventive measures, as the CCD already investigates 
countless cybercrime cases, the Hellenic Police Headquarters should additionally con-
sider recruiting in both the CCD and its CCSNG in order to efficiently continue to inves-
tigate the constantly evolving field of cybercrime. 
Moreover, as the LEA handles several cases involving an individual’s intention to commit 
suicide, the Agency should cooperate with non-governmental organizations and ISPs for 
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the immediate disclosure of the networking data and the recent geolocation activity of the 
users who express suicidal intentions through the Internet. 
An innovative recommendation would be the launch of the so-called “cyber patrols”. A 
“cyber patrol” is the inspection of the cyberspace by utilizing several tools and technical 
means, in order to detect the existence of hints that would possibly result in the commit-
ment of a crime (distribution of drugs, frauds, terrorism, etc.). The gathered information 
would be properly evaluated and in cooperation with the other competent authorities, the 
CCD could initiate an investigation in order to verify the occurrence of the criminal ac-
tivity. 
The fact that the CCU’s police agents need to be constantly well trained and specialized 
in fighting every type of cybercrime can easily be understood. Therefore, the CCD along 
with the Hellenic Police Headquarters should aim at educating its specialized agents 
through their participation in seminars, conferences and trainings initiated by national, 
European and international organizations. To this extend, the conduction of trainings to 
its staff, for the acquisition of theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of cyber 
security and specifically in the technical field of collecting and preserving digital evi-
dence should be prioritized. Training and education in the field of combating cybercrimes 
which are committed through the exploitation of the “Dark Web” should be also empha-
sized.  
Finally, the CCD should carry on with its engagement project, in terms of informing the 
citizens and raising public awareness on issues of preventing cybercrime. Hence, the 
Agency should maintain its course on hosting conferences and lectures to provide useful 
information and advice to the public and especially to young people, in order to protect 












Social Media Platforms have laid the foundations of the new “Information Era”. Cyber-
space is constantly expanding and these platforms have significantly contributed to this 
phenomenon. The establishment of cybernetic societies is depicted in every aspect of our 
everyday lives; “cybernauts” can communicate, transact, express their thoughts and wor-
ries, and ultimately turn their daily routine into a digital reality. Social media have existed 
for a while now, but their vast explosion was observed in 2005, soon after the introduction 
of Web 2.0. SNSs introduced numerous innovative services and technologies, which have 
utterly changed the nature of the Internet. Until then, users could only browse through 
websites, with the possibility of providing additional material or altering the existing con-
tent of the visited site being entirely absent. Hence, SMPs and in particular SNSs have 
established an imaginary relationship among all Internet operators. A single user can 
simply create an account and provide content that can be widely visible from every person 
on this planet. From “Facebook” and “Twitter, to “LinkedIn” and “Tinder”, users can 
effortlessly find what they are searching for. Still, as SMPs depict the character of our 
society and contain every aspect of it, criminality could not be excluded.  
Crooks and pedophiles, terrorists and hackers exploit SMPs’ provided services to pester 
users in any possible way. Even though the benefits that these virtual communities pro-
vide are multilateral, the feature of anonymity can be a dangerous tool in the hands of an 
ambitious criminal. “Netizens” use the Internet in good faith and rarely understand that 
criminals have infiltrated its defenses. On several occasions, after the commitment of an 
online criminal activity, citizens have addressed the Law Enforcement Agencies in order 
to seek for protection and for further prosecution of the perpetrators. However, in many 
cases conventional police officers either lacked the proper specialized training or were 
simply unable to identify the unknown criminals, who were hiding behind the anonymity 
of the Internet. Thus, the introduction and formation of specialized police authorities, 
which would specifically investigate online criminal activities, was deemed critical. 
These police forces are widely known as Cyber Crime Units and since their establishment, 
they have contributed in a great extent to the protection of “netizens”, the prevention of 
cybercrime and the identification of several unknown perpetrators. In any case, apart from 
the continuous specialized training and the endless effort that the cybercrime agents put 
in order to eradicate criminality on cyberspace, LEAs needed an ally in their fight against 
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lawbreakers. These allies were no other than SMPs, the entities that have witnessed the 
thriving of criminality in their cores. All that these entities had to do was to simply pro-
vide information to LEAs which would in any other case be beyond their reach.  
Whenever a user registers in a SNS and creates a new account, s/he is required to provide 
several personal information. E-mails accounts, usernames, telephone numbers, identifi-
cation details, etc., are information requested by the user in order to generate his/her 
uniquely identified account. Moreover, as thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2, SMPs gather 
and process a considerable amount of information, which the user voluntarily or unwill-
ingly provides to the entity. Networking information, geolocation activity, affiliations, 
communications’ content and many more are data collected through the platforms’ auto-
mated processes and utilized to maximize the users’ virtual experience. Nevertheless, as 
noble as data processing may appear to be, it is not always used for legitimate purposes. 
Distribution of an individual’s stored information to third parties, unlawful process of 
data or infrastructure breaches, which caused the leaking of users’ personal data, were 
merely some of the incidents that have taken place. Therefore, legislators were obliged to 
take the appropriate measures to eradicate these incidents and protect the users’ personal 
data. The General Data Protection Regulation was put into force in order to reassure the 
public that by using any kind of SMP, it would not result in the infringement of the citi-
zens’ rights.   
As mentioned above, SMPs collect and process all types of information from their users. 
As a result, LEAs were obliged to form an alliance with the entities, which in some way 
rule the “Information World” and seek their assistance in order to face the challenges of 
cybercrime investigations. Therefore, along with the implementation of international col-
laboration amongst all LEAs, Cyber Crime Units have cooperated with several SMPs in 
a joint force against cybercrime. Numerous SMPs have developed and implemented their 
own private platforms, through which police agents can request the disclosure of an un-
known perpetrator’s processed information. Furthermore, LEAs may request the provi-
sion of common users’ data in cases of imminent threats of physical injury, suicide or 
missing person cases. All in all, SMPs are able to provide information, which in case they 
were examined and analyzed by an experienced and well-trained police officer, they 
would be able to solve any type of both online and traditional criminal activity. 
Apart from the disclosure of a user’s personal data, SMPs provide much more information 
to LEAs. Police agents utilize SMPs in order to engage the public, investigate perpetrators 
-101- 
 
and perform intelligence techniques online. Engagement is of outmost necessity in any 
aspect of police work, as through this process LEAs can easily interact with the public, 
inform citizens regarding any ongoing criminal activity and prevent its spreading. More-
over, LEAs can receive tips from anyone who wishes to aid the police Agency, infor-
mation that in many cases can either prevent the execution of a crime or save another 
person’s life. Investigation and intelligence gathering are applied through several special-
ized methods and tools, like “O.S.INT.”, “Social Media Profiling” and “Social Cyber 
Forensics”. The aforementioned techniques can extract data from users’ accounts, which 
if analyzed appropriately, they can possibly lead to the eradication of all kind of crimi-
nality, either online or in the real world.  
A unique example of a Cyber Crime Unit that has utilized SMPs to eliminate cybercrime 
is the Hellenic paradigm. The Hellenic Cyber Crime Division is a LEA which except for 
solving numerous cases and identifying several unknown perpetrators, displays the au-
thority’s social aspect on a daily basis. The Agency has adopted most of the practices 
offered through the utilization of social media. Apart from developing its own websites, 
the LEA has created accounts on various SMPs in order to be a part of the existing virtual 
community. In addition, the CCD organizes plenty of seminars through which citizens 
and organizations can be well informed and protected against cybercrime and the cyber-
space, in general. 
Moreover, both through the real time scenarios and the conducted interviews with the 
high-ranking officers of the Agency, it can easily be assumed that an investigation re-
volving the identification of an unknown online perpetrator is not as easy as it is consid-
ered to be. The Agency consists of police officers with specialized training in every aspect 
of cybercrime. From forensics examiners to data analysts, ethical hackers and psycholo-
gists, the LEA tries to predict every imminent threat and its ultimate purpose is to prevent 
cybercrime before its occurrence. In case that the criminal activity has actually been com-
mitted, specialized police officers employ their knowledge and techniques and with the 
assistance of the SMPs they can methodically investigate the cybercrime and prosecute 
the identified perpetrator. The only issue that arises from the alliance forged among the 
Hellenic CCU and the various SMPs it that the disclosure of the requested data usually 
demands long-lasting procedures and time-consuming bureaucratic paperwork. In com-
bination to the current legislation, according to which the national ISPs are obliged to 
delete subscribers’ information after one year of storage, these two facts may possibly 
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result in the loss of evidence that would probably identify an unknown criminal actor. 
Unfortunately, this is a challenge that regardless of technical training and specialization, 
no cybercrime agent can overcome. 
Through the entire thesis, the concepts of users, cybercriminals, SMPs and CCUs have 
been thoroughly analyzed. One may easily come to the conclusion that these four entities 
consist the greatest part of the whole cyberspace. Users are the ones who enrich it with 
their content. SMPs are the bodies which unite the users. Cybercriminals exploit both of 
them to their own benefit. Last but not least, CCUs exist in order to protect both users 
and SMPs, and hunt down cybercriminals. So far, SMPs and CCUs have been cooperating 
in the digital war against cybercriminals. In case that this cooperation persists and con-
tinuously evolves, then it will eliminate cybercrime once and for all. But, if not? Hope-



















One of the issues raised regarding the disclosure and utilization of a user’s personal data 
for legal investigations is the protection of an individual’s right to privacy, which is spe-
cifically described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The right to 
privacy, is a fundamental right and is enshrined in Article 12 of the UDHR. According to 
it, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”. Apart from the UDHR, 
it is also enshrined in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). In brief, both Articles protect all people against any unlawful and “ar-
bitrary interference” with an individual’s privacy, affiliations, personality, beliefs and 
communication. In respect to an individual’s private life, Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, titled “Respect for private and family life” 
and “Protection of personal data” respectively, mandate the protection of a person’s per-
sonal information, of any kind, and his/her right to live without the externalization of its 
aspects. All the rights mentioned above were recognized in order to protect a civilian from 
both illegitimate and unlimited process or exploitation of his/her personal data.   
On many occasions, both average users and offenders accentuate that LEAs trespass their 
right to privacy and acquire their personal data for various illegitimate reasons. They be-
lieve that due to their fundamental rights for privacy, by using SMPs and in particular 
SNSs, they build defensive walls against any case of data processing. Truly, these rights 
do protect data subjects and their privacy. Nonetheless, no one can claim that by using 
cyberspace, s/he can demonstrate his/her illegitimate purposes and not held accountable 
for them. Everyone must understand that by utilizing SMPs they just gain anonymity, not 
remission for their illegal actions.  
The aforementioned rights were recognized in order to protect people from the phenom-
enon of arbitrary and unrestricted distribution of an individual’s personal data to third 
parties. No one can abuse the legislators’ good intentions which are no other than protect-
ing the society’s citizens. However, according to the common opinion, these fundamental 
rights were established in order to create imaginary legal boundaries, so that no law en-
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forcer would be allowed to investigate anyone. To this extend, a criminal’s right to pri-
vacy and right for protection of personal data would excess the rest of the peoples’ rights 
to live peacefully, without any kind of intrusion.  
Corresponding to Article 12 of the UDHR, Article 29 of the Declaration states that: “In 
the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” While the UDHR’s func-
tion is not the explanation of the Article by default, it assumes that limitations on a per-
son’s rights are desirable, albeit on some occasions necessary. A closer look to the defi-
nition of the term “crime” will clarify any raised confusion. When a person commits any 
type of felony, s/he infringes another person’s fundamental rights. Either when it comes 
to the right to protection of personal data (Article 8, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
or to the right to property (Article 17, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), no one should 
be allowed to infringe them and take advantage of the legislators’ protective wills. Thus, 
in cases that a person commits a crime, his/her right to privacy is thereby limited and the 
disclosure of his/her personal data, private life and any other type of information that 
could possibly identify the unknown perpetrator is not only considered legitimate, but 
most importantly it is deemed mandatory. After all, according to recital 7 LED “Ensuring 
a consistent and high level of protection of the personal data of natural persons and fa-
cilitating the exchange of personal data between competent authorities of Members States 
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